The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

22 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
another uprising, this time by Pissuthnes, the sa trap at Sardis. 99 This
rebellion was even more dangerous, for Pissuthnes was the legitimate
grandson of Darius I, the experienced and well-entrenched satrap of
an important province, and his army included a force of Greek mercenaries.
100 Darius sent a force against him under the three generals,
the chief one being Tissaphernes. They bribed the mercenaries away
from the sa trap, paying off their chief with lands and cities. Pissuthnes
was killed and his satrapy given to Tissaphernes. Darius was forced
to beat off still another, apparently lesser, threat to his throne some
time after 418. 101
During these troubles Darius must have been glad he had come to
terms with Athens, especially between 42 I and 415, when Athens was
formally at peace and in practice regaining its strength and ambition.
After the defeat of his enemies, however, and the establishment of his
rule on a firm basis, Darius might look westward in the hope of regaining
Persia's lost provinces. But with Athens at peace, Sparta occupied
in the Peloponnesus, the Athenian navy in control of the sea,
and the Athenian treasury being filled by the increased tribute payments
while not being drained by military expenditures, the Persian
king could take no action. He must wait for a better opportunity. As
one scholar has put it, "had it not been for the Athenian expedition
to Sicily, he might have had to wait for a very long time. " 102
An objective and well-informed observer of the scene in 413 might
have drawn some surprising conclusions. In spite of the Sicilian disaster,
the damage it had done to Athens, and the great enthusiasm of
its enemies, the outcome of the war was not much more predictable
than it had been at its start in 4 3 1 . If the Athenians could keep their
nerve, limit expenditures, and keep control of their allies, they need
not give in, even though the defeat in Sicily provided an invitation for
Persian involvement. Unless the Persians were willing to make a considerable
investment, the Athenians could not be defeated at sea, and
Persia's willingness to pay the price had yet to be demonstrated. No
99
Ctesias 52· The date can be any time between 423 and 415; H. D. Westlake's
arguments for a date early in the reign, in Phoenix XXXI (1977), 321-322, are persuasive.
100
For Pissuthnes' lineage, see Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 55. The commander of the
mercenaries was an Athenian named Lycon, but as Andrewes (Historia X [196!], 4, n.
10) and Westlake (Phoenix XXXI [1977], 321, n. 8) point out, his origin is no indication
of the policy or actions of his native state.
101
Ctesias 53· For the date, see Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 81.
102
Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 82.