The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

SPARTA'S RIPOSTE 97
without Greek allies and with no adequate force to bring about a
satisfactory end to the war and the recovery by Persia of its former
complete control of Asia Minor. He had turned away from Sparta
because he wanted to wear out both sides, and at the beginning of
winter, he had thought that the Spartans' numerical superiority at sea
made them the stronger power."' No doubt Lichas' harsh language
and lofty talk about liberation frightened him in the same direction,
but the events of the winter proved his calculations wrong. The Athenians,
though fewer than the enemy, ruled the sea unchallenged while
the Spartan ships were beached.
What Tissaphernes feared now was not Spartan victory but Spartan
desperation. Since their renunciation of Persian aid, the Spartans had
collected 32 talents from Rhodes. At the rate of 3 obols per man per
day that would not maintain the crews of the Peloponnesian ships at
Rhodes for a month, much less the eighty days that Thucydides tells
us they stayed there . .., As they ran out of money to sustain them,
Tissaphernes was afraid either that the Spartans "would be compelled
to fight a naval battle and lose, or that their ships would be emptied
by desertions and the Athenians would attain their ends without his
aid; but beyond that, what he feared most was that they would ravage
the mainland in search of subsistance.""' Perhaps Tissaphernes
thought that his recent conversations with the Athenians, though abortive,
would show that he was not permanently bound to the Spartans'
cause and make them more reasonable. " 4 In any case, he wanted the
Spartan fleet under his control at Miletus, where it could defend that
strategically important port from Athenian attack and where he could
keep a watchful eye on its activities.
Thucydides tells us nothing of the Spartans' reasons for changing
their attitude and policy, but they are not hard to understand. The
Persian talks with the Athenians must have alarmed them. Their hopes
of being able to support their fleet without Persian funds had proved
to be illusory. Worst of all, the events of the winter had shown that
they could not hope to defeat the Athenians at sea without a great deal
of help from the Persians. Money was needed immediately, but the
behavior of the Spartan leaders both before and after the conclusion
of the third agreement with Persia suggests that they counted on the
1118.52.
111
8-44-4; HCT V, 92, 137.
IJJ8.57.1.
114 Such is the suggestion of Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 102.