The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

392 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
Lysander out to attack thirty ships and then to launch the rest of the
fleet against him, appears entirely foolish. Lysander knew perfectly
well the size of the Athenian fleet and could not have been deceived
by such a maneuver. 55
Perhaps we can make more sense of events by combining the second
and third suggestions. In that case, the plan would be to lure Lysander
from Lampsacus by feinting a withdrawal to Sestos. The Spartans
might be emboldened to attack a detacbment of thirty ships in the
process of withdrawal and then to turn on the rest of the fleet, which,
they might believe, would not be expecting to fight. If that were the
plan it was not a bad one, for Lysander had done almost exactly that
at the battle of Notium, where he had attacked the Athenian commander
Antiochus, who was at the head of a small squadron; had sunk
his ship; and had defeated the rest of his fleet before it was ready. 56
Philocles may have hoped to lure Lysander into an attempt to repeat
his triumph at N otium and then to take him by surprise with an attack
from the main Athenian fleet, this time ready for battle.
Such a plan required secrecy, discipline, and careful coordination
between the divisions of the fleet if it were to succeed, but none of
these elements was present on the day of the fight. After the battle
there was much talk of treason. 57 Lysander, who was prepared to use
the skills of the fox and to chl'at men with oaths, was certainly willing
to bribe an enemy to reveal his plans. Diodorus tells us that Lysander
had learned of Philocles' plan from deserters from the Athenian fleet. 58
This is possible since desertion across the narrow strait would not have
been difficult. Knowledge in advance of Athenian intentions would
have been helpful but not essential. After all, the Athenians could not
stay at Aegospotami forever. Either they would withdraw in one direction
or another with their entire force, leaving Lysander free to
recover control of the cities on the coasts, or they would try some
stratagem. All Lysander needed to do was to wait patiently until the
time came, to keep a close watch on the enemy, and to maintain his
own forces in a condition of discipline and readiness to take advantage
of any opportunity. The fact is that knowledge in advance would not
"Strauss, AJP CIV (I98J), 25, n. 5·
56
See above, JI6-J•7·
57
Adeimantus, Alcibiades, and Tydeus were accused of treason at one time or another.
We hear of no such charge against Conon, but he was careful not to return to
Athens after the battle. See Busolt, GG III:2, 1623, n. 1.
58
IJ.I06.z.