The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE FALL OF ATHENS 389
near by and had come down to the camp at Aegospotami on horseback!'
He pointed out the inadequacies of the place as a base and
advised the generals to move to Sestos, where they would have a city,
a harbor, adequate supplies, and a place from which they could fight
whenever they liked. He also claimed to have the friendship of the
Thracian kings Medocus and Seuthes, who, he alleged, had agreed to
give him a large army with which he could finish off the war with the
Spartans." The offer seems promising, and we should not be surprised
that Alcibiades thought of it. Athens' greatest naval victory at the
battle of Cyzicus, in which Alcibiades had played such an important
part, had been won by the skillful use of combined operations on land
and sea. The fighting in the Hellespont between 411 and 407 had
shown the need for land troops to support the fleets. If the Athenians
could employ a superior land army against Lampsacus, they could
force Lysander's hand. If the city were taken, the Spartan fleet would
be deprived of supplies and could be starved out. The Spartans would
then be forced either to fight their way out or surrender. If they fought,
locked in the harbor, they would almost surely be defeated and, shut
in by the Athenian fleet and with the land in hostile hands, the Spartan
fleet would be annihilated, as it was at the battle of Cyzicus.
The Athenian generals, however, rejected both the advice and the
offer. The advice was not as good as Alcibiades thought, for in spite
of the disadvantages of Aegospotami as a base, the Athenians needed
to stay close to Lysander's fleet. The offer, on the other hand, presented
an important opportunity, but there were adequate reasons for the
generals' refusal. One of them must have been simple disbelief in
Alcibiades' ability to deliver on his promise. He had made many promises
in the past that he had not carried out, most notably to bring
Tissaphemes over to the Athenian side. He was fully capable of promising
a vast army, regaining a position of influence in the AtlJenian
army, and then delivering only a fraction of what he had promised.
42
Plut. Ak. 36.5; Xen. 2.1.25; Diod. IJ.I05-J; Nepos 7.8.2.
4 JXenophon (2. 1.25) speaks only of the advice w move the base. Diodorus (IJ.I05-3)
mentions only the offer to supply Thracian troops. Nepos (7 .8) mentions both, presenting
Alcibiades as giving the advic~ to move after his offer of military aid was
rejected. Plutarch (Ale. J6.s-37-2) also mentions both, although in a different way.
After his advice to move is rejected, Alcibiades leaves, telling his friends that if he had
not been insulted by the generals, he would have forced the Spartans to fight or lose
their ships because his Thracian troops could attack the enemy camp. Whatever the
order of these events and the details, there is no reason why he should not have made
both the suggestion and the offer.