The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE WAR IN THE HELLESPONT 215
with 112 ships. Since then the Athenians had sent 20 ships to meet
the Spartan challenge in the Hellespont and 13 with Alcibiades, leaving
75. 17 Mindarus did not want to risk a battle at such odds if he could
help it. Although a naval battle at some time was inevitable, the Spartans
would prefer to fight it in the confined waters of the Hellespont,
always near land, where they could enjoy the support of the Persian
army of Pharnabazus, rather than to face the more experienced and
skillful Athenians on the open sea in the familiar waters around Samos.
Mindarus, therefore, planned to sneak past the Athenians. Acting
swiftly and secretly, he put his fleet into good order and suddenly
headed westward out to sea in the hope of slipping past Samos before
the Athenians knew he was gone. A storm came up, however, forcing
him to take shelter Jlt learns for five or six days (see Map 3), but his
luck was not entirely bad, for he was able to make his way to Chios
without being intercepted. 1 '
Alcibiades was away in the south, and Thrasybulus had been sent
ahead to deal with a revolt at Eresus on Lesbos, 19 so Thrasyllus, not
an experienced commander, was in charge on Samos. He had been
raised from the rank of mere hoplite to the office of general, although
he appears never to have commanded a regiment or a ship. His important
role in checking the oligarchic rebellion on Samos seems to
have been the chief reason for his popularity and his election,'" but
his inexperience would soon prove costly.
The escape of the Spartan fleet was not the only problem facing the
new commander of the Athenian forces on Samos. A rebellion had
once again broken out on the important and troublesome island of
Lesbos. The city of Methymna on the northern shore of the island
(see Map 3) had been one of Athens' staunchest allies. The Methymnaeans
were the only loyal Lesbians during the great Mytilenian
rebellion of 428!27 and, along with the Chians, were the only autonomous
allies still providing ships instead of tribute at the time of the
Sicilian campaign. 21 The Sicilian disaster, however, shook even its
17
5ee HCT V, 31, 344· Thrasybulus took five ships to deal with a rebellion at Eresus
(8.100.4-5), but we cannot be sure just when.
168.99.
19 8. 100. I, 4-5.
2
°For the career of Thrasyllus, see the fine article of W. J. McCoy, AJP XCVIII
(1977), 264-289. For his early career and rise to influence, see 265-266.
21 J.2, s. IS, so; 6.Bs; 7·57· At 6.Bs.z the Athenian Euphemus refers to the Chians
and Methymnians as both being autonomous and providing ships: v«::Wv 1TapoKwx1)
aln-6-voj..LOUI;. At 7. 57.5, speaking in his own voice, Thucydides describes the Chians