The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

CONCLUSIONS 419
possession of those things. It was only necessary to continue to inflict
naval defeats on the Spartans until the political situation in Persia
changed decisively. Had the Athenians defeated Lysander in the Hellespont
in 405, or even averted defeat at that time, the decisive moment
might have come in the spring of 404 with the death of Darius. That
would have removed Cyrus from power and very probably put an end
to adequate and reliable Persian support for Sparta. The new king
might have been inclined to reject the policies and associates of his
brother and rival; he might have reverted to his friend Tissaphernes'
old policy of supporting the weaker against the stronger power while
giving neither enough help for victory, or he might have lost interest
in the Aegean entirely, as the Persians had largely done between the
battle at the Eurymedon in the 46os and their intervention a halfcentury
later.
Thucydides was also right to see internal strife as a major cause of
the Athenian defeat, but here again, we must examine more precisely
what this means. It does not mean that factional quarrels led to betrayals
that cost Athens the war. We have no reason to believe that
Thucydides accepted the allegations that blamed defeat at the battle
of Aegospotami on treason. Moreover, it is worth noticing that the
democratic regime that emerged from the most striking examples of
factional strife-the oligarchic coup of 411, the moderate countercoup
in the same year, and the reversion to complete democracy in 41o-­
carried on the war more effectively than any since the Sicilian disaster.
Those "private quarrels" certainly did not lead to the defeat of Athens.
Perhaps we may approach Thucydides' intentions by assuming that
he refers to the factional and personal conflicts that led to the two
expulsions of Alcibiades. It is certainly hard to believe that events
could have gone as badly for the Athenians in Sicily had Alcibiades
remained as one of the commanders, and if there had been no Sicilian
disaster, it is not likely that the allies would have dared rebel or the
Persians intervene. Without these developments, the Athenians would
not have lost the war. If that is what Thucydides means, we must
agree with his judgment. His words, however, seem to refer to the
period after the calamity in Sicily, to the Decelean or Ionian phase of
the war. In that case, he would mean that the exile of Alcibiades after
the battle of Notium was crucial for Athenian fortunes. If the implication
is that Alcibiades' gifts as a military leader were vital to Athenian
success, we cannot agree. The evidence is that Alcibiades was a commander
of considerable ability, particularly in certain special areas such