The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE WAR IN THE AEGEAN 49
it without demur because of his incompetence. 84 But whatever its legal
status, the agreement was effective, for almost immediately the Spartans
put their forces at the service of Tissaphernes in his campaign
against the rebel Amorges, just as they promised in the treaty. 85 Another
approach is to emphasize the vague, imprecise, incomplete nature
of the agreement: "this is a very simple-minded document .... No one
seems to be thinking the first clause through to the point of determining,
for example, whether Sparta is going to have to go back on her
new treaty with Erythrae." In this view Sparta's motives are inexplicable:
"Since Chalkideus, the negotiator of the treaty, soon got killed
(24. 1), no one was in a position to ask him what he was playing at. " 86
Other scholars speak of the necessities of war and Sparta's great hatred
for Athens, which blotted out all thought of the future. 87
There is considerable merit in this view, but it still leaves open the
question why the Spartans should make a treaty with so few advantages
to them, one that they would soon reject and renegotiate. Chalcideus
may have been a diplomatic neophyte, easy for an experienced Persian
like Tissaphernes to gull, but at his side stood Alcibiades, a veteran
of many negotiations and far from innocent of the diplomatic arts. It
is not hard to believe that Alcibiades helped persuade his inexperienced
commander to act quickly. No doubt he argued that quick action was
needed if Chalcideus were to get the credit for bringing about the great
achievement, an alliance with Persia. Details were unimportant, he
might well say, and could be changed later. The main thing was to
get a commitment from the Persians before some other Spartan, perhaps
a member of Agis' faction, could arrive and win the prize. All
of this is conjecture, for no ancient source speaks of Alcibiades' role.
But if Alcibiades did not make such arguments to Chalcideus, they
were at least relevant to his own circumstances. His time was running
out, as the enmity of Agis threatened his position and his safety. He
needed striking achievements, and he needed them at once. The treaty
of Chalcideus might be criticized, but for the moment it was a great
84
Hatzfeld (Alcibiade, 222) speaks of "the inexperience of Chalcideus, badly informed
in diplomatic formulas and oriental tricks."
85
8.28.2-4. The point is well made by Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, 222, n. 5·
86
Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 90-91.
87 Busolt, GG Ill:2, 1427, n. 1. In the same vein]. B. Bury (History of Greece, rev. R.
Meiggs, 4th ed. [New York, 1975], 307) says: "In the hope of humbling to the dust
her detested rival, the city of Leonidas now sold to the barbarian the freedom of her
fellow-Greeks of Asia."