The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE WAR IN THE HELLESPONT 229
presence of an important general. The fleet of Dorieus, on the other
hand, continued to pose a possible threat to Athenian possessions.
Perhaps more important, it was likely to be called to the Hellespont
to reinforce Mindarus. Alcibiades might do more good by preventing
Dorieus' arrival than by going to the Hellespont himself. It seems
likely, therefore, that Alcibiades was ordered to stay at Samos to keep
watch on Dorieus, meet any attacks he might make on Athenian allies,
and, most important, prevent him from getting past Samos to the
Hellespont. If indeed those were Alcibiades' responsibilities, he failed
to carry out the most important one, for when he finally arrived in
the Hellespont, it was on the heels of Dorieus, who had slipped by
him. 64
The Hellespont had become the center of attention for everyone,
and Tissaphernes, too, was on his way there. The news that Mindarus
had taken his fleet from Miletus to Abydos made the satrap quit Aspendus
and travel north. He was jealous of Pharnabazus and fearful
that his rival satrap, using less time and money, would succeed against
the Athenians where he himself had failed." But he was moved by a
more tangible fear as well. The Greeks, recently under Persian sway
at Cnidus and Miletus, had rebelled against Tissaphernes and had
ejected his garrisons, although in the latter case the Spartan Lichas
chastised the rebels and urged them to abide by Persian rule." Now
Tissaphernes learned that the Antandrians, on the Aegean coast opposite
Lesbos (see Map 3), had collected hoplites from the Spartan
base at Abydos, had marched them overland, and had driven his lieutenant
Arsaces and the Persian garrison down from their acropolis and
out of the city!' This was truly alarming. The Spartans were out of
the Aegean, no longer dependent on Tissaphernes' money and promises,
and very angry with him. They had already taken the first action
against him at Antandrus, complaints against him were being heard
in Sparta, and there was no telling what further harm his "allies" might
yet do to him. His plan to keep the Athenians and Spartans roughly
equal in strength, suing for his favor and under his control, so wearing
them both out until he should have the final word, had gone awry
64 1 owe this understanding of Alcibiades' actions to David M. Weil, "Alcibiades'
Role as a Naval General in the Peloponnesian War, 411-407 B.c." {Senior essay in
History, Yale University, 1984).
61
8.108.3, 109-
668. 109; Miletus: 8.84.
678.108.4-5.