The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSAE 34 7
case, they could have ignored the diekplous and, with their superior
skill, easily could have attacked the Athenians in the flank and rear.
With such an advantage, it is hard to see how they could have lost the
battle, much less suffer the terrible disaster they encountered.
With the double gap, however, the Athenian line covered the space
normally occupied by I 55 ships in line abreast, overlapping the enemy
by at least 16 or I 7 ships at each end." In such a position, with the
double lines protecting their wings and the island their center against
the diekplous, and the length of their own line preventing the enemy's
periplous, the Athenians were in good order to avoid undue harm to
themselves and to do great damage to their enemies." The Athenians'
division of their wings into eight independent units, moreover, each
under its own commander and able to act separately from the rest,
allowed them to take the offensive with safety. Xenophon gives us the
clue that shows how they proceeded. As Callicratidas came toward
them, "the Athenians came out against him, extending their left wing
out towards the open sea."" Since the wings already outflanked the
Spartan fleet, the looping movement to the left was even more threatening
to the Spartan right, for unless it were met, it might circle behind
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1f they lined up away from the center, using the entire island as a way of extending
their line, as suggested inn. 70, above, their advantage would have been even greater.
7 J Apart from the argument just given, there are three pieces of evidence that tend
to support the suggested alignment. Diodorus (1].98.4) tells us that the Athenians
included the islands in their battle order, "being eager to extend their line of ships as
far as possible" (O"'JT€11Bwv On 1T~EW7ov 11'0.pEK7ECvm 'TiXIi va~). The arrangement
suggested here seems to suit that purpose well, while others do not. The second evidence
comes from Xenophon's report of Hermon's warning to Callicratidas, when the Spartans
came close enough to see the Athenians' numerical superiority (1.6.p). If the
Athe.nians were separated by the usual distance, they would have been outflanked, as
we have seen. It is hard to see how Hermon could have determined that the Athenians
were superior in numbers in that formation. Nothing, however, could have been easier
than to see that the Spartans were numerically inferior when they were outflanked.
The most direct and powerful evidence in favor of this reconstruction is another passage
in Diodorus (q.98.4), which tells us that Callicratidas "was unable to make his line
equal to the enemy's because the islands took up too much space" (00 8uv6:J.LEVOcrm mt