The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

268 - THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
elections of generals after the regular ones that were held under the
Five Thousand in the spring of 410." Finally, there is no reason to
think that domestic political considerations governed Athenian military
policy in the summer of 410.
Moreover, such an assumption about the influence of domestic politics
is unnecessary, for the Athenians had good and sufficient reasons
to wait until 409 to send out a new force and to send it to Ionia before
going to the Hellespont. A body of fifty triremes, 5 ,ooo of its rowers
equipped as peltasts and light-armed, mobile infantrymen; 1 ,ooo hoplites;
and 100 cavalry-the forces actually sent in 409-all together
would be composed of ll, 100 men. 87 Even if all were paid at the low,
post-Sicily rate of 3 obols daily, the cost would be almost 30 talents
a month, and the fleet could not set sail without several months' salary
in hand. There would also be troop- and horse-carriers for the hop lites
and cavalry, and the state would have to provide the peltasts with
weapons. In mid-summer of 410, however, the treasury was almost
empty. 88 But during the year, money became available from various
~ 6 Andrewes' belief in a new election is not supported by the evidence he adduces
but depends on accepting his general view of the situation. Of Theramenes he says:
"He could hardly feel friendly towards the radical democrats or they towards him,
and it is most unlikely that he was elected general in these years" (}HS LXXIII [I95J],
4). (1) Against this i~ the undoubted fact that Theramenes held commands in each year
in question. If they were "irregular," only modem theorists say so. Alcibiades, as we
have seen, also held commands every one of those years, but Andrewes excludes him
from the board of generals for 41o/9 on the grounds that another general for that year,
Pasiphon, came from his tribe. (2) But the evidence is clear that the presence of two
men from the same tribe on the board of generals was more frequent than infrequent
in the years between 441/40 and 412/u. In that stretch we know of eight or nine
doublets. There are three years in which we find two sets of doublets and one in which
there was a doublet and a triplet (Fornara, Generals, 71). Nothing, therefore, can be
concluded from the fact adduced, much less the following statement: "It is to be
presumed that the restored democracy held fresh elections, cancelling or passing over
any appointments the sooo made for 410/9" (Andrewes, JHS LXXIII [1953], 6). (3)
Andrewes' other evidence against Alcibiades' generalship is that he was nervous about
returning to Athens in 407 and that Xenophon refers to him as being an exile (pheugonta)
while away from Athens. As we have seen, these matters can both be explained as the
result of Alcibiadcs' legal situation and his legitimate fear of prejudice against him by
some Athenians. They need say nothing about his generalship. As to Thrasybulus,
Andrewes proposes no evidence against his legitimate command in these years, saying
only that he was no extreme democrat and may be presumed to share the equivocal
position of his two colleagues. None of the evidence adduced proves what it intends
to grove.
Xen. I.I.J4, 1.2.1; Diodorus (13.64.1) gives the number of ships as only thirty,
but Xenophon appears to be better informed about this expedition.
88 Ferguson, Treasurers, 38, cited by McCoy, AJP XCVIII (1977), 277.