The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSAE 335
its capture and withdrew to the Hekatonnesoi Islands to the east of
Methymna (see Map I I).
Callicratidas must have received information of the location of the
Athenian fleet. With characteristic boldness he set out before dawn to
cut off Canon's retreat to Samos, but the excellence of the carefully
selected and well-trained Athenian crews overcame the effects of surprise.
The Athenians escaped the trap and made their way to sea. By
now the Spartan fleet numbered I 70, so Conon could do nothing but
flee and try to reach safety in the harbor of Mytilene. The Spartans
and their allies had been in service with regular pay for a year, and
Lysander had given them excellent training during that period. Also,
their numbers had been increased by the arrival of many skilled and
experienced rowers deserting from the Athenian fleet, so their quality
had become comparable to that of Canon's men. As a result, the
Athenian ships were not able to put distance between themselves and
their pursuers as they ran for port and safety. Callicratidas' ships
arrived at Mytilene about the same time as Conon's. The narrowness
of the entrance to the harbor and its defenses allowed 40 of the Athenian
ships to reach the safety of land, but 30 were lost in the fighting at
the mouth of the port, although their crews escaped. Callicratidas
appears to have planned an attack on Mytilene even before these events,
for after the victory at Methymna, he had placed the Spartan Thorax
at the head of a body of hoplites, ordering him to march overland to
Mytilene." Now he ordered his newly acquired allies at Methymna
to bring their entire force, and he also brought over his army from
Chios, as he completely blockaded Mytilene by land and by sea."
Canon's situation was extremely perilous. He was cut off from obtaining
supplies, and he found himself in a large city containing many
people who had revealed themselves to be hostile to Athens in the
past. Recent events at Methymna had shown the danger of betrayal,
even in a town that was much more friendly to Athens. All of his
l7Diod. IJ.J6.6.
38
The foregoing account derives almost entirely from Xenophon (1.6.I5-18). Although
Diodorus (13-77·2-79·7) gives a very different account, with the usual greater
fullness of detail, on this occasion I find it hard to believe. According to Diodorus,
Conon fled with with the intention of giving battle off Mytilene. In my view, he could
not have meant to fight at all with only 70 ships against I]O. He fled from the Hekatonnesoi
because he could not withstand an assault or a siege there and was in danger
of losing his entire fleet. If he could get to Mytilene, he might be able to hold out until
relief came from Athens. The rest of Diodorus' account contains details that are also
difficult to accept.