The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE WAR IN THE HELLESPONT 233
darkness probably prevented a total disaster, but the cost of the battle
was great enough. The Athenians captured thirty Peloponnesian ships
and recovered the fifteen they had lost at Cynossema. Mindarus stole
away to Abydos under cover of night with his remaining fleet, and
the Athenians retired to Sestos. The next morning they returned at
leisure to collect their damaged ships and set up another trophy of
victory, not far from the first one at Cynossema. 77 Once again, the
Athenians commanded the waters of the Hellespont.
For the rest of the winter, Mindarus stayed at Sestos repairing his
fleet and sending to Sparta for both military and naval reinforcements.
His plan was to join with Pharnabazus and attack Athenian allies on
the Asian coast by land and sea." The proper Athenian response would
have been to maintain a superior fleet in the Hellespont, reinforce it,
and try to bring on another battle to annihilate the remaining enemy
force at Sestos. Failing that, and Mindarus was unlikely to oblige them
by offering battle, the Athenians ought to have cut off any attempt at
naval reinforcement to the enemy and moved to recover the cities that
had rebelled from their empire in the region of the Hellespont, Propontis,
and Bosporus. 79 The Athenians were prevented from taking
these steps by their lack of money. While Pharnabazus continued to
support the Spartans generously, the Athenian treasury was exhausted.
80 The Athenian crews could not sustain themselves without
pay, and the treasury at Athens could not provide it. The battles at
Cynossema and Abydos, moreover, had shown the importance of hoplites.
The narrowness of the straits often led to the ships' being hauled
up on shore, turning a sea battle into a fight on land, and the Athenian
forces were short of hoplites.
The Athenian generals at Sestos, therefore, divided their fleet among
themselves, along with their various responsibilities. Alcibiades and
Chaereas commanded the forty ships that stayed on guard in the Hel-
77 Diod. IJ-47-I; Xen. I. I.].
71
Diod. 1]·47·2.
79
8usolt (GG III:2, 152 3-1524) thinks the Athenian generals intended to gather forces
for an attack on lonia, "since the enemy's main force was defeated and held fast in the
Hellespont." But he takes no notice of the reinforcements that were on the way, the
support of Pharnabazus, and the considecable fleet still under Mindarus' command. It
would have been folly to sail out of the Hellespom with such an enemy force still
intact.
60
ATL Ill, 366; W. S. Ferguson, The Treasurerr of Athena (Cambridge, Mass., 19p),
41; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 370.