The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

4I8
THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
possible. Thucydides' answers to these questions seem to arise very
clearly from his general remarks on the war: the fact that the Athenians
held out for so long after the Sicilian affair is extraordinary; the Athenians
"destroyed themselves" by means of internal disharmony. 12 The
evidence we have examined, both in Thucydides' account and in that
of those who continued the narrative, supports those opinions in general.
Thucydides' language, however, is terse, and his precise meaning
is far from clear, so we need to examine it more closely.
The Athenians' ability to hold out so long after the destruction of
their forces in Sicily and the damage that it did to their prestige are
truly remarkable. Thucydides makes the point to demonstrate the
correctness of Pericles' predictions and the rightness of his strategy.
We have argued, however, that Pericles' strategy was a failure and that
Athenian resources would not have been adequate to last even through
the Archidamian War had not his successors departed from that strategy
. 13 Moreover, in another passage Thucydides tells us that the Athenians
would have lost as early as 4 II had not the Spartans shown
themselves to be "the most convenient of all opponents. " 14 Here, Thucydides
seems on more solid ground, for after the campaign in Sicily,
the prolongation of the war depended less on the excellent fighting
qualities of the Athenians, although they were very important, than on
the failure of their opponents. If the Spartans could persuade the
Persians to make the commitment needed to provide a navy capable
of defeating the Athenians and to maintain it as long as necessary, the
Athenians would lose, for Athens lacked the financial resources to
match the Persian treasury, and money was the essential element.
Athenian hopes rested on dividing their opponents and defeating the
enemy's fleets until the Persians became discouraged and lost interest.
That they could do this for so long was a tribute to their naval skill,
their courage, and their determination but, even more, to the Spartans'
difficulties in gaining adequate and reliable Persian support.
In light of those difficulties and the shifting political situation that
made Persian assistance unreliable, Thucydides was entirely right to
suggest that the Athenians might have emerged from the war with a
Periclean victory, that is, with their walls, their fleet, and their empire
intact and with the Spartans in no position to challenge their continued
n2.65.12-13.
JJKagan, Arcbidamian War, 350-362.
148.96.5.