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The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

MACEDONIA is GREECE and will always be GREECE- (if they are desperate to steal a name, Monkeydonkeys suits them just fine) ΚΑΤΩ Η ΣΥΓΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΔΟΤΩΝ!!! Strabo – “Geography” “There remain of Europe, first, Macedonia and the parts of Thrace that are contiguous to it and extend as far as Byzantium; secondly, Greece; and thirdly, the islands that are close by. Macedonia, of course, is a part of Greece, yet now, since I am following the nature and shape of the places geographically, I have decided to classify it apart from the rest of Greece and to join it with that part of Thrace which borders on it and extends as far as the mouth of the Euxine and the Propontis. Then, a little further on, Strabo mentions Cypsela and the Hebrus River, and also describes a sort of parallelogram in which the whole of Macedonia lies.” (Strab. 7.fragments.9) ΚΚΕ, ΚΝΕ, ΟΝΝΕΔ, ΑΓΟΡΑ,ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑ,ΝΕΑ,ΦΩΝΗ,ΦΕΚ,ΝΟΜΟΣ,LIFO,MACEDONIA, ALEXANDER, GREECE,IKEA

MACEDONIA is GREECE and will always be GREECE- (if they are desperate to steal a name, Monkeydonkeys suits them just fine)

ΚΑΤΩ Η ΣΥΓΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΔΟΤΩΝ!!!

Strabo – “Geography”
“There remain of Europe, first, Macedonia and the parts of Thrace that are contiguous to it and extend as far as Byzantium; secondly, Greece; and thirdly, the islands that are close by. Macedonia, of course, is a part of Greece, yet now, since I am following the nature and shape of the places geographically, I have decided to classify it apart from the rest of Greece and to join it with that part of Thrace which borders on it and extends as far as the mouth of the Euxine and the Propontis. Then, a little further on, Strabo mentions Cypsela and the Hebrus River, and also describes a sort of parallelogram in which the whole of Macedonia lies.”
(Strab. 7.fragments.9)

ΚΚΕ, ΚΝΕ, ΟΝΝΕΔ, ΑΓΟΡΑ,ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑ,ΝΕΑ,ΦΩΝΗ,ΦΕΚ,ΝΟΜΟΣ,LIFO,MACEDONIA, ALEXANDER, GREECE,IKEA

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422 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE<br />

two occasions, and we have suggested that on at least one occasion,<br />

after <strong>the</strong> battle <strong>of</strong> Arginusae, <strong>the</strong> A<strong>the</strong>nians would have been well<br />

advised to accept. Had <strong>the</strong>y done so, <strong>the</strong>y would certainly have averted<br />

defeat in 405, and <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> Darius in <strong>the</strong> next year might well have<br />

removed <strong>the</strong> threat to <strong>the</strong> A<strong>the</strong>nian <strong>Empire</strong> for a very long time. Why,<br />

<strong>the</strong>n, did <strong>the</strong> A<strong>the</strong>nians reject <strong>the</strong> opportunity? It is easy enough to<br />

point to <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> demagogues and to denounce <strong>the</strong> foolishness<br />

and volatility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> A<strong>the</strong>nian democracy, but <strong>the</strong>re were skillful demagogues<br />

like Hyperbolus in A<strong>the</strong>ns in 42 I, and <strong>the</strong> city was no less<br />

democratic <strong>the</strong>n; yet <strong>the</strong> A<strong>the</strong>nians made peace, swiftly followed by<br />

a treaty <strong>of</strong> alliance with Sparta. Moreover, if we have judged <strong>the</strong><br />

situations rightly, <strong>the</strong>re was a much better argument for peace in 406<br />

than in 421. It was precisely <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> that peace and <strong>the</strong> disappointment<br />

and suspicion it caused that may help explain <strong>the</strong> A<strong>the</strong>nians'<br />

refusal to accept a negotiated peace when it might have been much.<br />

more advantageous.<br />

In 42 I <strong>the</strong> A<strong>the</strong>nians abandoned <strong>the</strong> war just when circumstances<br />

were about to give <strong>the</strong>m great advantages and opportunities. 17 When<br />

<strong>the</strong> Spartans failed to carry out <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace, <strong>the</strong> A<strong>the</strong>nians<br />

tried to save it by making an alliance with <strong>the</strong> Spartans and returning<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir prisoners, one <strong>of</strong> A<strong>the</strong>ns' most valuable assets. <strong>The</strong>y did <strong>the</strong>se<br />

things because <strong>the</strong>y were tired <strong>of</strong> war and so eager to maintain <strong>the</strong><br />

peace that <strong>the</strong>y were persuaded to run some risks and give up tangible<br />

advantages for a chance to preserve it. <strong>The</strong> results were disappointing<br />

and infuriating. Sparta did not return Amphipolis, and <strong>the</strong> Boeotians<br />

did not restore Panactum intact." <strong>The</strong> A<strong>the</strong>nians were convinced that<br />

<strong>the</strong>y had been deliberately deceived by <strong>the</strong> Spartans and soon made<br />

alliances that kept hostilities alive. <strong>The</strong> memory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se events was<br />

burnt into <strong>the</strong> minds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> A<strong>the</strong>nians, most <strong>of</strong> whom were <strong>the</strong>reafter<br />

certain that <strong>the</strong> Spartans were not to be trusted. That memory played<br />

a vital part in leading <strong>the</strong>m to reject Spartan <strong>of</strong>fers <strong>of</strong> peace later, when<br />

acceptance would have been advantageous. <strong>The</strong> advocates <strong>of</strong> peace in<br />

42 I allowed <strong>the</strong>ir eagerness to achieve it stand in <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> objective<br />

assessments <strong>of</strong> reality and sound policy. Had <strong>the</strong>y insisted on <strong>the</strong><br />

fulfillment <strong>of</strong> commitments and on actions ra<strong>the</strong>r than words, <strong>the</strong>y<br />

might have compelled <strong>the</strong> Spartans to meet <strong>the</strong>ir obligations, <strong>the</strong>reby<br />

establishing <strong>the</strong> basis for a lasting peace. Failing that, at least <strong>the</strong>y<br />

' 7 See <strong>Kagan</strong>, Archidamian <strong>War</strong>, 333-349·<br />

18 Kagao, Peace <strong>of</strong> Nicias, IJ-Jl.

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