The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE COUP 137
fighting and expense unnecessary. In any case, he would have made
his change of attitude and policy clear to Alcibiades before the meeting,
since the Athenian exile would serve as his spokesman.
When the meeting began, therefore, Alcibiades knew that he could
not deliver what he had promised, that the sa trap's demands were such
that no Athenian negotiators could accept them. In a desperate situation,
all he could hope to salvage was the illusion that he still had as
much influence with Tissaphernes as he had led the Athenians to
believe. 20 His purpose was to make it seem that the negotiations' inevitable
failure was due to the Athenians' unwillingness to accept terms
that he thought reasonable and that his failure to bring over Tissaphernes
was not due to his inability but to his decision not to bring
him over in light of the Athenians' attitude.
The negotiations were not brief, but extended over three sessions. 21
Thucydides tells us that Tissaphernes demanded that the Athenians
give up all of Ionia. Presumably, this means all of the cities on the
western coast of Asia Minor, an important part of their empire." He
also required that they give up "the adjacent islands and other things."
This would include many major places and sources of imperial revenue
such as Rhodes, Samos, Chios, and Lesbos. In spite of the great loss
this meant for Athens, the envoys agreed to these demands. At the
third and final session, however, Alcibiades conveyed a demand from
the satrap that the Athenians refused. He required that the Athenians
allow "the King to build ships and to sail them along his own coasts
wherever and in whatever numbers he wished. •m
20
This interpretation departs from Thucydides' in one important respect. He believes
that Tissaphemes entered the negotiations not wanting to make any agreement aw TO
&ioc;, "because of fear" (8. s6. 3), whereas the suggestion here is that the demands he
made were seriously intended and would have led to agreement had the Athenians
accepted them. The main reason for the suggestion is the extreme implausibility of the
motive mentioned by Thucydides, greater fear of the Peloponnesians than before. We
must remember that Thucydides had no independent knowledg~ of Tissaphemes'
thinking and was badly placed to make a good estimate. There is no reason to believe
that he had ever met the satrap. The likeliest source for the entire affair is Alcibiades
(P. A. Brunt, REG LXV [1952], 8o), and as usual, he appears to have magnified his
own part in events and to have persuaded Thucydides (ibid., 95).
11
This would appear to be further evidence that Tissaphernes sincerely hoped to
reach an agreement on his terms. If he wanted no agreement with the Athenians out
of fear of the Peloponnesians, he need not have held the conference. If he saw some
value in having the conference and placing the onus of its failure on the Athenians, he
could have presented all of the demands at the first session. The extended discussions
suy?,:est an attempt to gain an agreement.
s. 5 6. 4 ; HCT v, , 34 .
2 J8. 56+ This translation accords with the reading of all of the MSS: EmrroU, except