The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

CYRUS, LYSANDER, AND THE FALL OF ALCIBIADES 311
fleet in a straightforward naval battle, even with favorable odds of nine
to eight. But the passage of time allowed Lysander to increase the
quantity of his ships and improve their quality.
Plutarch suggests yet another reason why Lysander might have been
glad to wait: the higher wage pennitted by Cyrus' bounty "emptied
the ships of the enemy. For most of the sailors came over to those
paying more, while those who stayed were dispirited and rebellious
and made trouble for their commanders every day. " 75 Although Plutarch
exaggerates considerably, the evidence shows that there is much
to what he says. After the battle of Notium, the Athenian fleet should
have consisted of 108 ships, 76 yet when Conon came to relieve Alcibiades,
he was able to man only "seventy triremes instead of the former
number of more than one hundred" with which Alcibiades outnumbered
Lysander after the battle of Notium." The loss of sailors in the
battle cannot explain this diminution, for most of them survived. 78
When Callicratidas took over the fleet from Lysander in the spring of
406, some months after the battle, the Spartan fleet had grown to 140
ships. 79 It is inconceivable that the Spartan fleet could have grown by
50 ships at the same time that the Athenians' decreased by 38 if many
rowers had not changed sides. Plutarch has wrongly placed most of
the defections before Notium rather than after it, but he is right about
the phenomenon in general. Defections began, however, even before
the battle, 80 so Lysander will have been able to expect more and to
plan accordingly. We should not think, moreover, that Lysander could
or would have remained inactive indefinitely. He would be keenly
aware of the suspicion and dissatisfaction aroused by the long inactivity
of Astyochus. Neither Cyrus nor the Spartans would be satisfied with
a navarch who remained in port and allowed the Athenians to roam
freely about the Aegean doing as they liked. No doubt he hoped to
achieve overwhelming numerical superiority before offering battle, but
if a really attractive opportunity appeared before then, he was ready
to take advantage of it.
75Lys. 4·4·
76 At Notium the Athenians lost 22 of their original So ships, leaving 58. To these
ships should be added the 30 that were with Thcasybulus at Phocaea and the :zo that
came with Conon from Andros, for a total of 108. I owe this point and the calculations
to E. Riesling, "Notium," 12.
77 Xen. 1.5.I5, 20.
78
Xen. 1.5.14·
79
Xen. 1.6.3.
80
Diod. IJ.7l.J.