The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

CONCLUSIONS
42 I
that Athens desperately needed. Theramenes was the leader of the
Athenian moderates. Thrasybulus had the confidence of the democratic
sailors and, no doubt, many of their friends. Under normal
circumstances, they could have worked together to help produce unity
in Athens. Instead, the events surrounding the fiasco after Arginusae
embroiled them in a bitter controversy that further divided Athens
and undermined their influence. We do not know what their views
were in 406, but it is at least possible that they were among those who
favored accepting the Spartan peace offer. If so, they lacked the political
strength to win the argument, and the opportunity passed. Our
investigations have led us to conclude that Athens' hope for victory or
survival lay in the cooperative leadership of Theramenes and Thrasybulus,
but the disgrace of Alcibiades removed them from the leading
positions. In that very important sense, but in no other, the "private
quarrels" that produced the disgrace of Alcibiades led to the defeat of
Athens.
It is by no means clear whether Thucydides had in mind the removal
of Theramenes and Thrasybulus, and one of the many reasons we
have for regretting his failure to complete his account of the war is
that we will never know. In any case, the modern student of the
Peloponnesian War, with the full advantage of hindsight and the experience
of twenty-five centuries of history, may suggest still other
reasons for the Athenian failure. One, we have argued, was the solitary,
but effective, decision of Phrynichus to refuse to engage the Spartan
navy off Miletus in 412. At that place and time, the Athenians had
the chance to stamp out the rebellion in the Aegean before it had
spread too far and reached the Hellespont, before the Persians had
become deeply involved, and before the Spartans had found an effective
leader like Lysander. The opportunity was great enough to justify
considerable risk, but in fact, the risk was not unduly great." We
should not be surprised that the Athenians later blamed Phrynichus
for this decision and removed him from office as a result. What does
cause surprise is Thucydides' rare and vehement defense of Phrynichus
against his critics. 16
The failure to fight a potentially decisive naval battle at Miletus,
however, was not the only lost opportunity for Athens. We have seen
that during the last phase of the war the Spartans offered peace on
15
See above, 65-68.
~~~s .27 .s-6.