The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

SPARTA'S RIPOSTE 95
serious enough to ignore an Euboean invitation to bring that important
island into rebellion after the Boeotian capture of Oropus made success
more likely. Instead, their navy put to sea from Rhodes on a course
for Chios at the end of winter, perhaps some time in March, "' 6 but it
never got there. As they came to the region of Triopium, the Spartans
saw the Athenian fleet from Chalce sailing north. This time the Athenians
did not seek a fight but continued on to Samos. The Spartans
did not pursue them but gave up their plans for rescuing the Chians
and put in at Miletus, "seeing that it was no longer possible for them
to bring help to Chios without a naval battle. ""' 7
How can we explain the surprising behavior of both sides? The
Spartans, after pulling their ships on to the beach at Rhodes all winter
in fear of the Athenian fleet, at last sailed north in the direction from
which the Athenians had been challenging them. As Thucydides tells
the tale, they should have had every expectation of meeting the Athenians
at sea and fighting a battle. Yet at the first sight of the enemy
fleet, the Spartans gave up the attempt to rescue Chios and tamely
sailed to port. The Athenians, on the other hand, had moved their
fleet south to Chalce precisely to challenge the Spartans, to watch their
movements, and to force a battle when possible. Yet the Spartan sortie
found them away from their station at Chalce, sailing northward toward
Samos, and when they saw the Spartans on the open sea, they
ignored the long-sought opportunity and kept sailing. Neither Thucydides
nor any other ancient source explains this odd behavior.
A clue may lie in the Boeotian capture of Oropus. Its strategic
position in the hands of the enemy seriously threatened Euboea's continued
possession by the Athenians. The conquest of Oropus immediately
encouraged some Eretrians to pursue plans for rebellion of the
kind that had already been alive on Euboea the previous year and to
seek the support of the Spartan fleet at Rhodes."'' At this time Euboea
was of vital importance to Athens. When it revolted in the summer
of 411, Thucydides says "there was greater panic than ever before.
For neither the disaster in Sicily, though it seemed great at the time,
nor any other event had ever before frightened them so." The fleet at
Samos was in revolt, there were no more ships or men to sail them,
revolution threatened to break out in Athens itself, and now a terrible
106 8.6o. 1-2. For the problem of the date, see HCT V, 147-149·
J078.6o. 3·
wss.s.I,