The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE FALL OF ATHENS 379
contrary to the original treaty.' Those events had left the Athenians
with a sense that the Spartans could not be trusted, a feeling that had
never disappeared.
After the battle of Arginusae, they may have had the fear that the
Spartans, defeated and impoverished, might use a truce to restore their
relations with Persia, build a new fleet, and attack before the Athenians
were ready. The alternative was to take advantage of the moment,
seek out what remained of the Spartan fleet and destroy it, and hope
that Cyrus would be put out of play, as Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus
had been before him. The time must come, they might have thought,
when the Great King would tire of an investment that was repeatedly
lost. If such was the thinking of the Athenians, we must judge them
mistaken not merely because we know of the unhappy outcome of
their policy but because they should have seen its folly. The Athenians
could not be sure of forcing a battle at a time and place to their liking.
Cyrus was still satrap, and there was no sign of any change of policy
on his part. He had relented and granted support even to the unfriendly
Callicratidas; how much more readily would he give it to a friendly
Spartan commander such as Lysander? With Persian money in hand,
the Spartans could revert to the waiting game, allow Athenian resources
to run down even further, win over rowers by means of higher
pay, and fight at a time and place of their choosing. One more Athenian
defeat would certainly be the end; yet the Athenians could not refuse
to fight for long. These considerations, it appears, made a peace treaty
on the terms offered in 406 well worth the gamble, but the Athenian
assembly thought otherwise, and the war went on.
Not long after the Athenian rejection of peace, the Spartans received
a delegation from their allies in the Aegean asking that Lysander be
restored to command of the fleet.' During the winter of 406/5, the
suffering of the Spartan forces had required the Chians to make a
significant contribution of money to preserve their safety. The victorious
Athenian fleet at Samos was free to raid and plunder the islands
5 See 5.21-46; and Kagan, Peace of Nicias, 19-59·
6 Xen. 2. 1.6; Diod. q.Ioo.7; Plut. Lys. 7· 1. Since neither of the narrative historians
mentions the Spartan offer of peace and Aristotle does not place it in relation to any
event except the h!lttle of Arginusae, we cannot establish the sequence of events with
certainty. The sequence accepted here-the peace offer about the same time as the
conference of Sparta's allies at Ephesus, Athenian rejection of the peace, arrival of the
delegation at Sparta, and the decision to send Lysander to the Aegean again-is obvious
and- generally accepted. See, e.g., Busolt, GG Ill:2, I6I0-1612; J.-F. Bommelaer,
Lysandre de Sparte (Paris, 1981), 96-98.