The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

ATHENS RESPONDS 67
Athenian fleet under Diomedon and Leon easily swept the seas around
Chios and Lesbos clear of enemy ships. In the spring of 41 I, although
the entire Ionian coast was no longer in Athenian hands, the Spartans
were so afraid of the Athenian fleet that they sent an army to the
Hellespont by land. 62 Only two years after Phrynichus refused battle
at Miletus, an Athenian fleet inflicted a defeat on the Peloponnesians
at Cynossema in the Hellespont, although it was outnumbered seventysix
to eighty-six. 63
Alone among modern scholars, Andrewes has correctly described
the tactical and strategic situation. The Athenians had lost their best
crews in Sicily, but "they had not lost all their skill, nor the Peloponnesians
their sense of inferiority." Phrynichus' argument for drawing
back from Miletus to fight better another day had this flaw: "that
under the conditions he desiderates here Athens could never be sure
of forcing a battle." As long as the Spartans had a secure base on land,
they could refuse naval battles while sending off armies by land and,
by eluding the Athenian navy, even by sea to cause further rebellions
from Athens. The Athenians' best hope of getting the enemy to fight
a sea battle, in fact, lay in "luring the enemy out against an apparently
inferior force." The opportunity Phrynichus refused "offered such a
chance in that Therimenes had to take some positive action to save
Miletos and Phrynichus' colleagues expected that he would offer battle
by sea. If they had been allowed to hang on and fight, the course of
the war might have been very different. " 64
Even the modern supporters of Phrynichus concede that a naval
victory at Miletus would have been of decisive importance to the Athenians.
"If they succeeded in achieving the fall of Miletus," Meyer says,
"the attempt of the Peloponnesians would be shattered and the Athenian
Empire restored. " 65 For Busolt, "the retreat signified the abandonment
of the fruits of the siege and of the prospect of recovering
Miletus and all Ionia. " 66 He goes on to list the further consequences
of that retreat: the freeing of the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus from
62
8.6r.r. Ami.t (SC/ 11 [1975], 63) has seen the significance: "The forces moved by
foot ('ITE~TJ) from one theatre of war to another-which shows that the sea route was
closed to them. It is unnecessary to stress how difficult and tiresome it was for an army
to cover the long distance (200-250 miles) from lonia to the Hellesporit on foot."
63
8.104-106.
64
HCT V, 66-67.
65
Meyer, GdA IV:2, 27r.
66
Busolt, GG III:z, 1435.