The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

424 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
peace and alliance with Sparta, however, rejected the opportunity.
The Athenian response to Spartan behavior drove them from power
and set Athens on the path that could end the war by defeating Sparta
on land in the Peloponnesus, but the policy designed by Pericles and
continued by Nicias had become Athens' natural policy. A more aggressive
one that meant fighting on land but did not bring a quick
victory could not be sustained for long by a democratic Athens that
had grown accustomed to war at low risk and small cost in lives. By
the time the new policy urged by Alcibiades came to a crisis, the old
forces under Nicias were again dominant; men who shared his view
were the generals, and they carried out the more aggressive strategy
without boldness and conviction, glad to escape disaster as the new
policy was destroyed. Mter the defeat at Mantinea, Nicias and his
associates were pleased to return to the simulacrum of peace, although
real peace remained an illusion, for Athens and Sparta continued to
view each other with suspicion and hostility.
The destruction of the Sicilian expedition was a crucial turning point
in the war and made a powerful and lasting impression on all Athenians.
A terrible mistake in the form it finally took, it convinced Thucydides
of the folly of any offensive action and led him to endorse the
defensive and naval strategy with which Pericles began the war as the
only reasonable one. His own account, however, reveals that such a
strategy was unable to achieve even the limited victory that Pericles
envisioned, much less a victory that would deprive the enemy of the
capacity to fight made necessary by Spartan determination. For that,
the Athenians would have to take the offensive, face the need for a
major battle on land, and find a way and a time to win it. The way
was provided by the alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea and the
time was 418, but the Athenians shrank from the commitment needed
to win. Such a response is entirely understandable in a state that had
come to think of itself as an invulnerable island since its acquisition
of a fleet, a vast treasury, and defensible walls. It had developed a
unique and enviable way of fighting that used these advantages and
avoided much of the danger and unpleasantness of ordinary warfare.
It allowed the Athenians to concentrate their forces quickly and attack
the enemy before it was prepared; it permitted them to strike others
without danger to their own city and population. Success in this style
of warfare--in which offensive actions were taken only at sea or
launched from the sea, costing little in lives or damage to their own
property-made it seem the only one necessary, and defeats with great