The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE WAR IN THE HELLESPONT 237
of spring, he had collected a fleet of eighty ships, and the Athenian
commanders at Sestos were afraid lest he attack their own fleet of
forty." They therefore left Sestos by night and sailed around the
Gallipoli peninsula to the port of Cardia on its northern shore (see
Map 5) ..' From there they sent ships to Thrasybulus and Theramenes
in Thrace and Alcibiades at Lesbos with the message that they should
sail to Cardia as soon as possible. When the whole fleet was gathered
in one place, it numbered eighty-six, and "its generals were eager for
a decisive battle. " 9 ' At Cardia they heard that Mindarus had taken his
entire force off to Cyzicus on the southern shore of the Propontis (see
Map 5). Pharnabazus marched a large army to the same place; together
they besieged the city and took it by storm. The Athenian generals
decided to pursue the enemy to Cyzicus, force a battle there, and
recover the city. They sailed around to Elaeus and waited until nightfall
before undertaking the next leg of the journey. They moved past
Abydos under cover of darkness so that the enemy lookouts could not
see their numbers and made their way to Parium and from there to
the island of Proconnesus, just to the northwest of the peninsula on
which Cyzicus was located. 99
that the best account is that of Diodorus, and my own narrative follows him, making
use of the others where appropriate.
My version of the battle, along with the rest of the book, was in press when I
discovered A. Andrewes' excellent article discussing the battles ofCyzicus and Notium
(]HS CII [1982], 15-25). It is gratifying that the accoum offered here is in substantial
agreement with his.
96
Diodorus (•3·49-2) mentions Athenian "generals" at Sestos, and there may well
have been at least one other, unnamed, beside Chaereas. The figure of eighty ships is
his (1].50.2); Xenophon (I.I.II) gives the number as sixty, which may be right, but
I have preferred to accept the figure from the account that is in general superior.
•nxenophon 1 .1.11 provides the detail of the departure at night.
98 Such is a cautious rendering of Diad. 13 ·49· 3-4: 0'11'€006-vToJV 76JV O"TpaTfi'Y&-v 11'Epl.
7&-v OAwv &wKw&uvEWo-a~ .. A more literal translation would be: "They were eager to
run every risk for the whole thing." We cannot know just what they had in mind. The
"whole thing" could have been a final victory in the war; at the very least, it must have
meant control of the Hellespont. Xenophon's account, here and elsewhere, places
Alcibiades at the center of everything and ignores the other generals most implausibly.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that he is following a source close to Alcibiades,
perhaps even Alcibiades himself. (See Bloedow, Alcibiades, 55, n. 325.) For the number
of Athenian ships, see Xen. I.I.IJ.
99
Diod. IJ·49·J-6. Xenophon I.I.II-IJ tells the story as though Alcibiades was in
full command and making all of the decisions. He alone goes overland from Cardia to
Sestos and orders the fleet to sail around to meet him. From there he is on the point
of sailing off to battle with only forty-six ships when Theramenes and Thrasybulus
arrive with twenty ships each. Littman and Bloedow make clear how implausible that
account is. Where Xenophon and Diodorus differ on details about this journey to