The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

76 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
no reason to believe that Greek oarsmen were available who were better
than those already in use. The second device named by Alcibiades is
surprising: to call in the Phoenician fleet. Thucydides has him speak
of "the Phoenician ships that he was preparing," but no previous mention
has been made of any such ships. Probably, there had been some
talk earlier of bringing them into the Aegean, which Thucydides did
not mention. Perhaps the hope of gaining their support may help to
account for Chalcideus' acceptance of so one-sided a treaty. However,
we must ask whether the promise of a Phoenician fleet had any reality
at the moment. Some doubt has been expressed that such a fleet existed.
' 7 But Thucydides asserts its reality firmly, and we have no reason
to doubt him.'' Whether Tissaphernes ever intended to use it in the
Aegean will be discussed below,' 9 but in the early winter of 412/11
the Phoenician ships were clearly not ready for use. In the short run,
at least, Alcibiades' second suggestion suited the satrap well.
Alcibiades' last proposal was that Tissaphernes should abandon his
alliance with Sparta and draw closer to Athens. He argued that the
Athenians, as practicing imperialists, would have no hesitation in abandoning
the Greek cities on the continent while maintaining control of
the sea and the islands in it for themselves. They would be "more
suitable partners in empire."'" The Spartans, on the other hand, had
come as liberators of the Greeks, and they would hardly abandon their
freedom to the Persians when they were unwilling to leave them in
the hands of other Greeks. They would not cease to be a menace until
they were removed. Alcibiades' advice, therefore, was that Tissaphernes
should "first, wear out both sides, then reduce Athenian power
as much as possible, then finally, drive the Peloponnesians from his
land. " 3 '
These arguments should not have been persuasive. They pictured
the Spartans as simple idealists, totally committed to the cause of
freedom and to their allies, whatever the cost. A glance at Sparta's
behavior toward its Peloponnesian allies and its Melian colonists would
have served to raise questions about the accuracy of this description
of Sparta's character and policy. Nor was this picture of Athens more
27
E. Delebecque, Etudes classiques 11 (1967); Ann. Fac. Lettres Aix-en-Provence,
XLIII, 23, and Thucydide et Alcibiade (Aix-en-Provence, 1965), 177.
288.87.2-].
z 9 See Chapter Nine.
108.46·3·
)18.46·4·