The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

46 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
design, and execution. As he had promised, he had shown the Athenians
that he was still alive. 72
Alcibiades and Chalcideus wasted no time before exploiting their
victory. They took three ships to Clazomenae and brought it into the
rebellion. Next they moved against Teos, Chalcideus with twentythree
ships from the sea and a force from Erythrae and Clazomenae
marching overland. The fleet encountered an Athenian fleet at sea and
pursued it to Samos when the Athenian commander Strombichides
fled before superior numbers. The land force came to Teos and was
received in a way that reveals much about the problems faced by the
Ionian cities. Before Strombichides had been forced to flee to Samos,
he had come to Teos and had asked the Teians not to rebel. When
the army from Erythrae and Clazomenae arrived at their gates, they
at first refused them admission. But when the T eians realized that the
Athenians would not return, they allowed the army to enter. The
soldiers from the rebel cities tore down the wall facing inland to keep
the city open to their control, receiving help from a force sent by
Tissaphernes. 73 The Teians appear to have acted not on the basis of
internal divisions, class divisions, or preferences for one constitution
over another but merely out of a prudent concern for their safety. As
long as Athenian power was present, they remained loyal. When it
was absent, and hostile forces arrived, they accommodated to the new
reality. Not much later the Chians and their local allies brought about
the rebellion of Lebedos and Haerae, two small towns near T eos, and
then withdrew. Then Tissaphernes personally brought an army to
finish demolishing the walls of Teos, and he also departed. The appearance
of the Persians and their evident interest in resuming control
when the situation permitted must have made the protection of Athens
seem more attractive. But without their walls, the Teians were in no
position to resume the alliance with Athens. When the Athenians'
admiral Diomedon arrived with ten ships, the best agreement he could
make was that the T eians henceforth would admit the Athenians as
well as their enemies. 74 Throughout the rest of the war, they pursued
this unheroic but prudent policy and avoided the disasters suffered by
others. 75
Before long, the movement Alcibiades and Chalcideus had set in
"l>lut. Ale. 22.2.
73
8.16.
748.19. 3-4; 20.2.
75
My account is based on H. D. Westlake's article (CQ N. S. XXIX [1979], 12-14).