The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

388 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
ran out and before their wily opponent found an opportunity to slip
away. A withdrawal to Sestos, which could have provided a good
harbor and adequate supplies, would have had two serious disadvantages.
It would have forced the Athenians to row some twelve miles
to be in position to challenge the enemy, and thus they would arrive
tired and vulnerable." It would also have prevented them from keeping
close watch on the Spartan fleet. The Athenians had already been
embarrassed on more than one occasion b.y allowing the Spartans to
slip by or away from them. If Lysander sailed into the Propontis, as
the Athenians could not prevent him from doing from Sestos, he could
bring over other cities as easily as he had done with Lampsacus before
the Athenians could prevent it, perhaps even Byzantium and Chalcedon.
The Athenian generals could not afford the risk. For all of its
shortcomings, the beach at Aegospotami allowed them to challenge
the Spartans from short range and to prevent Lysander from slipping
by them."
As at the battle of Arginusae, here the Athenians appear not to have
had a supreme commander but to have made decisions by conference
and consensus. The six generals whom we know to have been present­
Adeimantus, Cephisodorus, Conon, Menander, Philocles, and Tydeus-rotated
the command on a daily basis." Their first strategy was
obvious: to sail into the mouth of the harbor at Lampsacus each morning
and challenge the Spartans to come out and fight. We do not know
the size of the Spartan fleet, but it may have been reasonably close to
the numbers of the Athenians' force."' Lysander, however, chose not
to take the bait, putting his ships in battle order but keeping them
close to shore!' The same routine continued for four days, no doubt
frustrating and annoying the Athenian generals. During that period,
the tension was increased by the appearance of Alcibiades, ready to
offer advice and assistance.
The Athenian exile had seen the situation from one of his castles
nsee above, n. 35.
38
Strauss (A]P CIV [I98J], z8) emphasizes the importance of close access, and Bommelaer
(Lysandre, 112) places great weight on close surveillance.
19
Strauss, A}P CIV (•98J), 29, n. 19.
40 After the battle, Lysander was able to put out to sea with 200 ships (Xen. z.2.5),
but some of them will have been among those captured intact from the Athenians at
the battle of Aegospotami. On the other hand, if the Spartan fleet was decidedly smaller
than the Athenian fleet, Lysander hardly could have been expected to accept the
challenge to battle.
41 Xen. 2.1.22-23.