The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE RESTORATION 269
sources and allowed the treasurers to disburse funds for military and
other purposes. 89 There is also considerable reason to doubt that the
Athenians had as many as fifty triremes available for the campaign in
410. 90 Practical considerations, therefore, required the Athenians to
delay the reinforcements.
In the summer of 409, Thrasyllus finally set out with his force but
not to the Hellespont. Instead, he sailed for Samos before launching
an attack on the Ionian mainlandn The decision to go there has raised
questions among modern scholars:' but it should not be surprising.
Thrasyllus had been sent to Athens from the Hellespont in the winter
of 4 I I I 10 after the battle at Sestos to ask for reinforcements!' Then
there would have been good reason to send a force to the Hellespont
immediately, had the Athenians been able to do so. In the spring of
410, after Cyzicus, it still would have been important to send a force
directly to that theater of warfare before the Spartans could restore
their navy, but as we have seen, Athenian resources were not yet up
to the challenge. By the summer of 409, however, the strategic situation
had changed. The Athenians in the Hellespont no longer faced immediate
danger, as they had after Sestos, nor did they confront an
extraordinary opportunity, for the Spartans once again had a fleet. A
delay of a month or so in beginning the campaign in the Hellespont
was not crucial. On the other hand, there were attractive prospects in
Ionia. Tissaphernes' satrapy must have appeared very vulnerable; he
had thoroughly alienated the Spartans on whose forces he had previously
relied, and in any case, they were off in the straits where they
had other concerns. Three Greek cities in his province-Miletus, Cnidus,
and Antandros-had ejected his garrisons!' Moreover, in most
cities there were Atticizers waiting to reverse policy if the Athenians
gained even temporary successes. 95 Victories in Ionia would restore
Athenian control, bring money into Athenian coffers, and build a
~McCoy, AJP XCVIII (1977), 277-278.
90
lbid., 273, n. 39·
111 Xen. 1. 2.1; Diodorus (• 3.64. 1) omits the early stages of the expedition and begins
his account with the attack on Ephesus.
91
lt is a central point in Andrewes' argument (]HS LXXIII [•9531. 2-9). See also
McCoy (A]P XCVIII [1977], 2]()-281), who follows Andrewes in accepting a political
exelanation for the choice of lonia.
3
Xen. 1.1.8.
94 8.84; 108.4-5; I Of}. I.
95
Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 371. For a good discussion of the situation, see McCoy,
A]P XCVIII (1977), 281-282.