The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE FALL OF ATHENS 399
Decelea under Agis and made camp. It was the first time since the
sixth century that both Spartan kings had appeared in the field at the
same time." In spite of the unprecedented and imposing forces arrayed
against them, the Athenians refused to yield and prepared to defend
their city. Xenophon says: "The Athenians, besieged by land and sea,
were at a loss as to what they should do, for they had no ships, no
money, no food." He was no friend of the Athenian imperial democracy,
and he explains its decision to hold out against all odds by
moralizing that the Athenians saw no way out but to suffer the same
atrocities they had perpetrated on so many others. 82 Probably, a better
explanation is that they held out in fear that capirulation would bring
them the terrible fate Xenophon had in mind, and they were right to
be afraid. The execution of the Athenian prisoners after the battle of
Aegospotami was a clue, if one were needed, to the anger of the allies.
In the months after that battle, the Thebans, Corinthians, and other
allies of Sparta made clear their desire to destroy the city of Athens,
rurning Attica into one great pasture, and to kill its people or sell them
into slavery. 83
With such a fate in prospect the Athenians had nothing to lose by
holding out, but in fact, the Athenians may have been moved by hope
as well as fear. The goals and interests of the allies were not necessarily
the same as those of the Spartans. In particular, the Thebans had
demonstrated ambitions of their own, sometimes in conflict with Spartan
interests. 84 They might be glad to see Athens destroyed and Attica
depopulated, for they, as powerful neighbors, could exploit the opportunity,
expand into the deserted territory, and increase their own
power. Perhaps, as time passed, the Spartans might see that they would
not be well served by such an outcome and offer terms more to the
liking of the Athenians. The Athenians also had reason to know that
Sparta itself was rarely unified in its policies. Lysander and others
might aim at an ambitious extra-Peloponnesian policy, but King Pausanias,
like his father Pleistoanax, might prefer the more traditional
one of withdrawal within the Peloponnesus and a policy of collaboration
with a friendly and reliable Athens. In any case, the Athenians
had little to lose by waiting to see if a better opporrunity might come
81 Xen. 1.2.8; Diod. IJ.IO].l; Plut. Lys. 14.1. The observation about the Spartan
kiny,s is made by Krentz (Tbirty, 30).
8
Xen. 2.2.10.
sJXen. 2.2.19; Plut. Lys. 15.2; And. 1.142, J.zi; Isoc. •4·31· 18.-z9;]ustin s.B.4.
114
See below, 405-406.