The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

CYRUS, LYSANDER, AND THE FALL OF ALCIBIADES 319
Lysander deserves great credit for this victory, which vindicated his
policy of watchful waiting, of refusing to fight until circumstances
made success probable. The performance of his fleet also demonstrates
the high quality of the training he had given his crews, for they responded
to his orders swiftly and maintained excellent discipline
throughout the battle. He himself demonstrated talent of a high order;
he was quick to see an opportunity and seize it and was decisive and
shrewd in using it to the full when greater prospects beckoned. The
key decision was to order his main fleet out in pursuit after he had
sunk Antiochus' vessel and seen the panic and confusion of the nine
remaining Athenian ships. Although they must have been ready to
come on signal, timing was everything; they must move quickly to
catch the main Athenian fleet at Notium unaware. The swiftness of
Lysander's appreciation of the situation and the alacrity of his fleet's
response speak very well for his ability as an admiral. Still, Lysander
could not have done anything without the mistakes made by Antiochus,
whose strategy was misconceived and whose execution was
disastrous. Such failures are not surprising in a man who had not
previously exercised command, and they raise questions about his
appointment. We have seen that Alcibiades had plausible reasons for
choosing Antiochus as his substitute, but even if these reasons are
accepted, it is impossible to free him from blame. To leave the main
Athenian fleet in the hands of an inexperienced man within a few miles
of the main enemy force was a gamble, and considering how serious
the defeat and possible destruction of that fleet would be, it was a
reckless and unjustifiable gamble.
In material terms, the Athenians' defeat at Notium was not very
serious, for they suffered few casualties, and they still had 108 ships
in the Aegean, more than the enemy. 106 It did, however, cancel Athenian
plans for recovering the lost allied cities in Ionia. The withdrawal
of the fleet from Phocaea put an end to the campaign there, and before
long Conon would have to abandon the siege of Andros. '"' In fact,
soon after the battle the Spartans seized Delphinium on the island of
Chios and Teos not far from Notium. '"' The Athenian soldiers and
joined there by Alcibiades, and the whole force coming back to Ephesus to challenge
Lysander in vain.
106
Alcibiades' 88 and Canon's 20.
107
Xen. 1.5.18.
108
Xen. I-5.15. The text reads Eion, but editors have suggested an emendation to
Teos on the basis of Diod. IJ-76·4· See Underhill, Commentary, 22.