The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE WAR IN THE AEGEAN
3 I
basis. 28 The first example, the alliance with Amorges, however, falls
into a separate category, neither entirely true nor completely false.
The basic facts are correct: there was a treaty of Epilycus, an alliance
with Amorges, Persian support for Sparta, and Athenian misfortune
as a result. But the "conclusions derived from these facts are by no
means above suspicion, and there is reason to believe that [Andocides]
is guilty of trying to deceive his audience. " 29 If Andocides is correct
and the Athenians made their treaty with Amorges before the Persian
negotiations with Sparta, we should have expected Thucydides to have
made note of that fact. Although his omissions are not infrequent and
sometimes are inexplicable, this one appears especially unlikely. Not
only would it be important for the reader to know the correct order
of events to comprehend cause and effect, but in this case, reporting
the events as Andocides does would forcibly support one of Thucydides'
chief interpretative themes, the reckless foolishness of the Athenian
democracy. 30 It seems more likely, therefore, that Andocides has
distorted the chronology to make his point, a common practice among
Athenian orators. 31 If that is so, the Athenians would have joined with
Amorges only after they knew of the Persians' overtures to Sparta "in
the following spring, ... when the Athenians knew that Tissaphernes
was plotting against them. " 32 At such a time, Athens would have little
to lose and something to gain by joining with a rebel against the
Persians.
But what, if not the news of an Athenian treaty with Amorges,
persuaded the Persians to approach Sparta with offers of help? The
most obvious and likeliest answer is that other news set events in
28
Andrewes (Historia X [r96r], 3) says that this assertion "must be imaginary, a
reckless heightening of the dramatic decision taken by Athens in 415." Westlake points
out that the story is not mentioned elsewhere, and he thinks it was "probably a fabrication
of his [Andocides') own designed to strengthen his plea for peace" (Phoenix
XXXI [r977], 325).
29
Westlake, Phoenix XXXI (1977), 325-326.
30
Westlake's statement of the matter deserves quotation: "One aspect of relations
between the Athenians and Amorges might have been expected to have aroused the
interest of Thucydides if indeed, when already engaged on a major offensive in Sicily,
they chose to sacrifice the advantages of their treaty with Persia by supporting a rebel
and thereby provoking Persian reprisals. Thucydides would surely have ranked this
decision among the errors in judgment whereby, in his opinion, through abandoning
the advice of Pericles, they brought upon themselves their ultimate defeat (2 .65. 7-13)"
(ibid., 327).
31
Ibid., p6.
"Ibid., p8-p9.