The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

92 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
port, until they saw the situation in a more favorable light. Policy as
well as vanity combined to make the satrap break off the conference.
Antisthenes and the xymbouloi had been ordered to move the center
of warfare north to the Hellespont, and it may be that Licbas' cavalier
tone with Tissaphernes was influenced by the expectation that he soon
would be supported by Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Asia.
An opportunity soon arose, however, that kept the Spartan fleet in
southern waters. A group of powerful men from Rhodes approached
the Spartans at Cnidus, urging them to sail to the island to bring it
over to the Peloponnesian side. The offer was tempting, for the island
was large by Greek standards, with a considerable body of men available
for military and naval duty and a prosperous economy to lend
financial support. Deserted by the Persian sa trap of Ionia, the Spartans
saw the acquisition of Rhodes as part of an opportunity by which they
might be able to support their fleet "from their existing alliance, without
asking Tissaphernes for money. " 96 With a fleet of ninety -four ships,
they sailed to Camirus on the western shore of the island (see Map 3).
The three cities of Rhodes were not unified into a single state, and
they were democracies. The people of Camirus were taken entirely
by surprise, knowing nothing of the coup arranged by the oligarchical
conspirators, and fled in fear of this mighty armada. 97 Called together
in an assembly of all of the Rhodians, they, along with the people of
Lindus and lalysus, had no choice but to revolt from Athens and go
over to the Peloponnesians about mid-January of 411. 98
The Athenians received reports of the Spartan intentions beforehand,
but by the time they got to Rhodes from Samos, they were too
late. This, too, was part of the price they paid for failing to take Miletus;
without a closer base than Samos, they could not protect southern
lonia, Caria, or the islands of the southern Aegean. Another price was
soon revealed, one that sharply contradicts Phrynichus' assertion that
if the Athenians refused battle at Miletus they would be able "to fight
at a later time ... having prepared adequately and at leisure." Although
the Athenian fleet, numbering only about seventy-five to the Spartans'
ninety-four, stood boldly out in the open sea off Rhodes, the Spartans
refused battle. Andrewes has shrewdly noticed the defect of Phrynichus'
strategy: "When the Peloponnesians felt themselves inferior but
968·44· I.
97 0n the situation at Rhodes, see HCT V, 91-92.
98 8.44.1-2. For the date, see Busolt, GG III:z, 1450.