The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE WAR IN THE HELLESPONT 241
forces. Chaereas and his hoplites were put ashore on the mainland
with orders to march against the city of Cyzicus. Dividing forty-six
ships between them, Theramenes and Thrasybulus each hid his fleet
in the little harbor to the north of the promontory. ' 08 With the remaining
forty ships Alcibiades sailed eastward, into Artaki Bay, directly
toward Cyzicus. ' 09 The stratagem worked perfectly. When
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Frontinus (2.5.44), who seems to be using the same source as Diodorus, says that
Chaereas' force landed at night. If so, it would probably have landed much further
north and well before the main fleet set out. I am not persuaded that this detail is
correct, for it would have required a longer march and left the troops exposed to
discovery for a much greater time. Discovery would have alerted the fleet at Cyzicus
and damaged the prospects of the entire plan. In the same passage, however, Frontinus
tells us that the Athenians hid part of their fleet ubehind a certain promontory" (post
quaedam promunturia), -surdy the promontory of Artaki. See Andrewes,JHSCII (1982),
2o-2 1. The ships could easily be concealed from the city ofCyzicus by the promontory,
which ends in a steep hill, so that they would be hidden from the Peloponnesians at
sea level at Cyzicus. Rahe points out, however, that they could be seen by lookouts
posted on high ground behind the city. G. S. Kirk made the same point about possible
lookouts on the heights of Arktonnesos, the large peninsula north of Cyzicus (Andrewes,
JHS en [1982], 2 I' n. I 8). That .is why the Athenians needed the protection of foul
weather to move into position to launch their unusual strategy. In bad weather, the
Peloponnesians would not have expected the enemy to come by sea. Probably no guards
were even at their posts at such times, but if they were, they would not have been
able to see the Athenian ships several miles away. Once the attack was launched,
however, and Mindarus, taking the bait, moved out against the advancing Athenian
squadron, no warning could come in time to help, even if the clouds suddenly
disappeared.
Frontinus' evidence provides support for an account that is compatible with Diodorus'
narrative. The first action he reports is the landing of Chaereas and his soldiers, but
he does not say where they were put aground. The likeliest spot would be at the harbor
of Artaki, where the entire fleet would be sheltered, as it needed to be in foul weather,
and where it would be easy to land an army. That was also the closest place on the
coast where it would be safe to put in. Diodorus reports that immediately thereafter
the fleet divided into three squadrons: Alcibiades "sailing far ahead of the others"
toward Cyzicus, "waiting to draw the Spartans out to a fight at sea," while Theramenes
and Thrasybulus lay behind and "prepared the device of encirclement and of blocking
the enemy's escape to the city" (1].50.1). But if Alcibiades was to move toward Cyzicus
with a fleet small enough to draw the Spartans out and other squadrons were to get
in behind them, those others needed to be nearby and yet om of sight. The place that
best met the requirements was the harbor behind the promontory.
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Diodorus (1].50.2) gives no number, although Vogel conjectured that the number
20 had dropped out of the MSS. There is no reason to accept that emendation. Xenophon,
though he dOes not give a number for this particular part of the plan, shows
Alcibiades commanding 20 ships later in the same battle (1.1.18). In this instance I
prefer Plutarch's figure of 40 (Ale. 28.4) with Littman(TAPA XCIX [1968D, and against
Bloedow (Alcibiades, 49, n. 294). Before Mindarus left Abydos for Cyzicus he knew
that the Athenians had at least 40 ships at Sestos. If he saw an Athenian fleet of only
20 approaching Cyzicus, he ought to have expected a trap and would have been reluctant
to come out to fight. Seeing 40 ships, however, he might well believe that the entire