The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

60 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
Its leaders must have seemed to have made a grave error in choosing
to launch an uprising against the still potent Athens.
At this point in his narrative Thucydides makes a remarkable digression,
defending the Chians against the charge of recklessness or even
foolishness. 37 He ranks them second only to the Spartans in their ability
to combine good fortune with self-restraint (eudaimonia and sophrosyne)
and admires them for governing their city more securely even as it
grew greater. "And even in regard to this rebellion, if they seem to
have acted contrary to their own safety, they did not risk undertaking
it until they were sure that they would meet the danger along with
many good allies. They also knew that, after the Sicilian disaster, the
Athenians themselves did not deny that their situation was very bad.
And if they miscalculated among the uncertainties that are part of the
human condition in this life, they shared this error with many others
who thought the same thing-that the Athenian empire would quickly
be destroyed." 38 It is tempting to think that here Thucydides was
defending the moderate oligarchy of the Chians, the sort of regime of
which he thought so highly, against the accusation that it had behaved
with precisely the same dangerous recklessness as the unbridled Athenian
democracy that he held responsible for the Sicilian campaign and
other foolish acts. 39
Even before their attack on Chios the Athenians had turned their
attention to reducing Miletus, the only other major Ionian city still in
rebellion. The blockading squadron at Lade launched a raid on Panormus
on the coast to the south of Miletus. They quickly withdrew,
but in the fighting they killed the Spartan commander Chalcideus.
Later in the year, perhaps in October, they undertook a much more
important campaign. 40 The generals Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides
had brought a fleet of forty-eight ships, some of them troop
carriers, to Samos. 41 Crowded onto these ships were no fewer than
3,500 hoplites-I,ooo from Athens, I,ooo from their Aegean allies,
and 1,500 from Argos. This was a large force of infantry for Athens
to put into the field at any time, but it was truly remarkable so soon
37
H. D. Westlake (Individuals in Thucydides [Cambridge, 1968], 2 36) suggests that
such a charge was made at the time, which is highly plausible.
'"8. 2 4·4-5.
39
Compare his praise of the Athenian government of the Five Thousand at 8.97.2.
""For the date, see Busolt (GG Ilb, 1432); and HCT V, 58.
41
8.25. I. For discussions of the numbers of triremes and troopships, see Busolt (GG
Ilb, 1433, n. r); and HCT V, 28.