The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

ATHENS RESPONDS
6 I
after the Sicilian disaster. Apart from its military purposes, the gathering
of so large an army, including so many loyal allies, must have
had a considerable effect on the morale of the Athenians who saw it
muster and sail off from Piraeus. The effort was proof of Athenian
determination to stamp out the rebellion in Ionia before it could become
more dangerous.
The generals wasted no time. From Samos they sailed to Miletus,
made a landing, and set up camp. The total number of the enemy's
forces is unknown, but they consisted of 8oo Milesian hoplites; the
Peloponnesian marines and, perhaps, some of the sailors that had come
with Chalcideus; a corps of mercenaries in the service of the satrap
Tissaphernes; Tissaphernes himself, at the head of his cavalry; and,
perhaps at his side, Alcibiades, the Athenian renegade, tenuously still
in Spartan service. 42 The order of battle set the Argives, who were
Dorians, against the Ionian Milesians. Thucydides says that the usual
Dorian contempt for Ionian opponents caused the Argives to advance
in disorder, far ahead of the rest of their line. Whatever the reason,
the Milesians treated their attackers roughly, killing at least 300 and
defeating the rest. The Athenians and their Ionian allies were more
fortunate. First, they routed the Peloponnesian contingent, and then,
they drove off the Persians and their mercenaries. When the Milesians
saw what had happened to their allies, they made no attempt to assist
them but withdrew into their city. The Athenians made camp before
Miletus, having won a great victory, which they formally marked by
setting up a trophy. The enemy had been driven from the field, and
his remaining forces were huddled in Miletus. All that remained was
to wall off the city and wait for it to surrender. The Athenians had
no doubt that "if they recovered Miletus the other cities would also
readily come over to them. " 43
With the Athenians victorious on land and superior at sea, there
was nothing to prevent their success. If only thirty of the newly arrived
squadron were triremes, with this number added to the twenty warships
already engaged in the blockade, the Athenians would have had
an advantage of fifty to twenty-five ships. The Peloponnesians' fear of
a sea battle had made them unwilling to fight when they were more
numerous, so the Athenians had little to fear at sea under the new
42 8.25.2. For the forces from Chalcideus' fleet, see Busolt (GG III:2, 1433; 1426, n.
1); and HCT V, 74· For Alcibiades, see 8.26.3.
438.25·5·