The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

262 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
Draco and Solon, meant to win the favor of the gods and to lend
confidence and courage to the Athenian people as they faced the efforts
and dangers that lay ahead of them.
Although Cleophon is the best-known democratic politician of the
day, we cannot know what part he may have played in carrying through
this new program of activity. The most dynamic and imaginative Athenians-men
such as Theramenes, Thrasybulus, and Alcibiades-seem
to have been with the fleet in the Hellespont. Probably no single man
planned the entire undertaking; instead, it seems to have represented
a broad consensus of ordinary Athenians without the leadership of
extraordinary men. Yet the entire program had an inherent logic and
made considerable sense, given its premises. If the terms of peace
offered by Sparta were unacceptable, the war must continue. That
would require financial reorganization. The oligarchs and moderates
had approached the financial problem by tightening the collective Athenian
belt, chiefly at the expense of the poor, hut that plan could work
only in the short run. If a quick peace could not he achieved, the only
answer was to expand the sources of revenue. The victory at Cyzicus
opened the possibility of doing so in the empire, and the resort to the
eisphora tapped domestic resources. The increase of public expenditure
to assist the hard-pressed Athenian poor has been criticized but unjustly.
The costs were not so great as to ruin Athens' prospects. If the
recovery of the empire and its revenues continued, they could be easily
sustained; if not, the war was lost anyway: In any case, there was no
way to continue fighting without attention to the plight of Athens'
poorer citizens. Finally, the building program, modest as it was, represented
an important and intelligent attempt to restore the Athenians'
moral and spiritual vitality.
In the end, however, the outcome of the entire program depended
on the military success of Athenian forces, and the newly restored
democracy got off to a good start in that respect. It was probably in
the month of July that Agis once again launched a raid from Decelea
that sent his troops right up to the walls of Athens. 64 No doubt he
thought that another change in regime might have caused internal
division and increased the chances of confusion, chaos, and perhaps
even treason, but once again his hopes were disappointed. Thrasyllus,
64 Xen. I.I.]J. Busolt (GG 111:2, 1p8-1p9 and n. 2 on 1528) places this event in
mid-March, but W. J. McCoy (A}P XCVIII [1977], 276, n. 49) makes a powerful case
for a date shortly after mid-summer.