The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

ATHENS RESPONDS 63
into the Gulf of Iasus to get better information, landing and making
camp at Teichiussa. 45 There, he encountered Alcibiades, who had
come on horseback from Miletus, and learned the outcome of the battle.
Thucydides tells us that Alcibiades was eloquent in urging swift action.
"If they did not wish to destroy their position in Ionia and their cause
in general, they should go to the aid of Miletus as fast as possible and
not stand by while it was walled off. " 46
The Peloponnesians took him seriously and made ready to sail for
Miletus at dawn, but Alcibiades' speed and eloquence proved to be
irrelevant. Before the Peloponnesians could move, the Athenians had
withdrawn and had left Miletus in enemy hands. The news of the
approaching Peloponnesian fleet had not daunted Onomacles, Scironides,
Strombichides, and Thrasycles, who wanted to stay in place and
fight a naval battle to the finish, but the remaining Athenian general,
Phrynichus, argued against them. 47 Thucydides reports his speech in
indirect discourse:
He said that he would not do it [fight a battle himself], nor would he allow
them or anyone else to do so, so far as he was able. For when it was possible
to fight at a later time, having more certain knowledge of how many ships
the enemy had and how many of their own were available against them,
having prepared adequately and at leisure, he would never, giving way to the
charge of disgrace, run a desperate risk. It was not shameful for the Athenians
at sea to make an opportune strategic withdrawal, but it would be more
shameful to be defeated, in any circumstances whatever. For the state did not
face disgrace only, but alsq the greatest danger; after the disasters they had
undergone it was hardly justified voluntarily to undertake any offensive action
whatever, unless it was absolutely necessary; it was even less justified, without
being compelled, to rush into dangers of their own choosing. 48
He advised the Athenians to collect their wounded and their hoplites
and supplies, but not their booty, which would burden the ships too
heavily, and return to Samos. "From there, when once they had gathered
together all their ships, they could launch attacks whenever the
time might be ripe. " 49
Phrynichus' argument carried the day, and the Athenians sailed to
Samos at dusk, "their victory incomplete," for Miletus was unconquered
and now free from both siege and blockade. A further conse-
45 See Map 4- For the location of Leros and Teichiussa, see HCT V, 62.
468.26.3.
47 8.27.1. For the names of the generals present, see Busolt (GG III:2, 1434); and
HCTV, 63.
48 8.27.2-3. For a discussion of the textual difficulties, see HCT V, 63-64.
498.27·4·