The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

286 -THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
might have heard of his characterization of its form of government as
"acknowledged foolishness";'• the priestly colleges of the Eumolpidai
and Kerykes, who had formally cursed him for mocking the sacred
mysteries; individual competitors for political leadership and their supporters;
and ordinary Athenians alienated by his defection and treason
at Sparta and the harm he had done Athens. Alcibiades could never
be sure that when he returned he would not be accused and brought
to trial on some serious charge, real or invented, and condemned once
again. Everything depended on the esteem in which he was held by
influential Athenians and the masses and on the value for Athens he
was thought to have_
Winning victories was obviously not enough, for even after the key
role he had played in the victory at Abydos and his brilliant performance
at Cyzicus, he did not return home, although he could have
done so. No doubt he was concerned about the risk of allowing others
to gain the glory of further victories and putting his own in the shade,
but there were risks in staying on as welL A long, unsuccessful siege
or a military defeat at Chalcedon or Byzantium would have undone
his accomplishments and left him in an unenviable position. No doubt
his good work at Selymbria and Byzantium added to his reputation
and confidence, but it may well be that the most important element
in his decision to return came from an action in which he was not
involved, the treaty of Chalcedon. When Pharnabazus refused to consider
that treaty valid without the oath of Alcibiades, he gave the
Athenian commander a unique opportunity that he used to full advantage.
By requiring the satrap to swear the oath again on equal terms
with himself, Alcibiades dramatized the special stature he had in the
eyes of the Persians at the very time when the Athenians had undertaken
negotiations with the Great King, relying on the good offices of
Pharnabazus to help them succeed. Alcibiades, therefore, was returning
to Athens in the spring of 407 not only as a spectacularly successful
general but also, once again, as the one man most likely to deprive the
Spartans of Persian help. It appears to have been that combination of
advantages that finally gave him the courage to set out for Athens.
The Athenian commanders made careful provision to leave the
northern theater of operations in good order. Thrasybulus went to the
coast of Thrace with thirty ships. There he brought back under Athenian
control the places that had gone over to the enemy, chief among