The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

104 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
The departure of the Athenian force under Strombichides for the
Hellespont, leaving only 8 ships behind, gave the Chians under Leon
thorough command of the sea around their island. This gave Astyochus
the courage to venture out to sea. Cautiously sailing from Miletus, he
slipped past Samos to Chios. He gathered the Chian and allied ships
that were there and, in a concerted movement, brought his entire fleet,
certainly more than 100 warships, to Samos, challenging the Athenians
to fight.''' This time it was the Athenians who refused to fight. Although
the Spartans had clear numerical superiority, it was only marginally
greater than what they had enjoyed at Rhodes the previous
winter, when the Athenians were the aggressors and the Spartans
refused to fight. '' 9 Thucydides explains the Athenians' restraint simply
and briefly: They did not come out against Antyochus because "they
were suspicious of one another. ,. .. o The reference is to the civil strife
that had recently broken out among the Athenians and divided them
into increasingly hostile factions. ' 4 '
The result was a complete reversal in the situation. For the moment,
at least, Athens had lost control of the sea and the initiative in the
war. The failure to take Miletus when the opportunity was at hand
had stopped the Athenians from snuffing out the rebellion of lonia
before it was fairly started and quickly led to the loss of most of the
mainland cities and some key islands. Now, with the naval blockade
of Chios broken, the Athenian hold on that crucial island became
precarious. Worse yet; the Spartans had achieved a base on the He!-
138
8.63. Thucydides is dot as dear about these movements as we would like. Andrewes
(HCT V, 15 3) believes Astyochus slipped past Samos with two ships, collected
only the twelve ships brought for Milerus by Loon, and brought them back to Miletus,
from where he sailed with the whole fleet to Samos. The account given here assumes
that Astyochus gathered all ships stationed at Chios and sailed with them directly to
Samos, where he met the rest of his fleet coming from Milerus. This would avoid his
having to sail past Samos again to Miletus with a fleet whose size would make it noticed
but which was too smaiJ to risk a.battle. The text will not allow certainty. Thucydides
gives no numbers for Astyochus' fleet on this occasion, although he specifies its number
at I I2 later (8. 79· I), and Busolt (GG III:2, I455) gives that number for this force. The
Spartans had at least 94 ships at Miletus and perhaps as many as 36 at Chios, for a
total of 1 JO. Presumably, they would have left at least a few ships at each place, but
it seems safe to place the battle fleet that went to Samos at least at roo.
n., At RhOOes the Spartans had 94 ships to no more than 74 Athenian, although the
Athenians probably had left at least a few ships to guard Samos. Perhaps the real ratio
was 94 to 64, a difference of 29. This time the Athenians had their 74 ships to face
anywhere from IOO to 115 ships, a difference of from 26 to 41.
140
8.6].2.
141
See Chapter Five.