The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

CYRUS, LYSANDER, AND THE FALL OF ALCIBIADES 317
the Athenians would either cut them off from their base and force a
battle or overtake them before they could escape. It must have seemed
to Antiochus that there was little risk; either Lysander would take the
bait and give the Athenians an opportunity for a major victory, or
more probably, he would refuse to fight, as he had steadfastly done
in the past.
Lysander, as we have seen, could not have intended to avoid fighting
for the rest of his term of command. Normally, he probably would
have waited longer to move, until the odds were even greater in his
favor, but Alcibiades' departure presented him with a special opportunity
and a new urgency. Deserters had brought him the news that
Alcibiades had taken his land troops to join Thrasybulus in the attack
on Phocaea. This told him that his delaying tactics would be more
costly from then on and that the Athenian fleet was without an experienced
general and in the hands of a man who had never before
held a command. It was an opportunity not to be missed, and Lysander
decided "to do something worthy of Sparta. " 99 He was ready when
the moment came, and his careful preparation paid dividends. It may
well be that overconfidence, encouraged by previous Spartan inertia,
led Antiochus to be careless as he sailed toward Ephesus. Perhaps he
forged ahead too fast and allowed too great a gap between his ship and
the second one in the column, or perhaps he came too close to shore;
in any case, he was not prepared for what happened. Lysander
launched a lightning attack against the lead ship of Antiochus with
three triremes of his own. 100 He quickly sank it, killing Antiochus. 101
The trailing Athenian triremes were stunned. They panicked, turning
to flee toward Notium, and the entire Spartan fleet set out in pursuit.
Lysander did not need his entire fleet to chase nine ships. He must
have understood that things had not gone according to the Athenian
plan, whatever that might be. He had reason to expect that the remainder
of the Athenian fleet would be confused and disorganized
refers to the enemy ships). Bommelaer (Lysandre, 92) proposes [W.;; EK Toil XLJLf.voo;]
1rpocra~6J.LEvoo;, which would mean "to induce them to leave the harbor ."The meaning
is clear in any case: Antiochus' maneuver was meant to draw the enemy out to sea in
the direction of Notium. His instructions to the rest of the fleet make it clear that he
intended to draw the Spartans so far out as to allow the main Athenian fleet to attack.
99
Diod. IJ.7I.J.
100
Hell. Oxy. 4.2. Xenophon (t.5.IJ) and Plutarch (Ale. 35.6) speak of "a few" ships.
Diodorus (1 J· 71. J), omitting the detail, has the entire Spartan navy launching at once.
101
Hell. O.ty. 4.2, with note in Bruce, Commentary, 4o-41; Plut. Lys. 35.6.