The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE WAR IN THE HELLESPONT
2IJ
in Egypt that might belong to this period. Some scholars believe that
the danger was so great "that the fleet was removed from Tissaphernes'
command and returned to Phoenicia, where it might be needed in
operations against the rebels."' But it would be surprising, though not
impossible, if such an important rebellion with such a significant outcome
took place and Thucydides knew nothing about it. 9 The new
evidence, moreover, says nothing about any Arabian activity and little
about the extent and importance of the Egyptian movements, which,
in any case, cannot be dated with precision or certainty. There may
have been some truth in all of the motives of Tissaphernes reported
by Thucydides: to exhaust the Peloponnesian forces, to defend himself
before the Spartans against charges of treachery, and perhaps even to
blackmail the Phoenician sailors into paying him money for releasing
them from service, but the best explanation seems to be his own.
Tissaphernes never intended to use the fleet but meant to wear down
and equalize both sides so that he would be in control. We need not
doubt that the satrap explained his behavior to the Spartans as caused
by a major threat to Phoenicia, but that was only a pretext. 10
Mindarus stayed at Miletus for over a month in the hope that the
Phoenician ships would appear." The delay must have been most
annoying, for the lieutenants Tissaphernes had left behind at Miletus,
principally the Egyptian Tamos, provided no support at all." But the
Phoenician ships did not come. The strain was even greater because
8 Lewis, Historia VII (1958), 396, endorsed by Andrewes, HCT V, 21)0, 445-456.
9
D. Lateiner (TAPA CVI [1976], z67-29o), argues strongly against the likelihood
that such an event could have escaped the historian's notice and narrative and supports
Thucydides' own interpretation. He emphasizes the poor record of the Phoenician fleet
against the Greeks and believes, therefore, that Tissaphernes never intended to use it
because, among other reasons, it could not have been the decisive force Thucydides
ex~ected it to be.
0
Lewis (Historia VII [1958], 396) says: "Alternately [to the theory of a real and
serious revolt in Egypt], but perhaps less probably, Tissaphemes decided that he did
not want the fleet, but used the Egyptian revolt as a plausible excuse for the Spartans."
Not only would I reverse the order of probability, I would also point out that the
passage in Diodorus (13·46.6) does not speak of a revolt in Egypt but of a plot against
Phoenicia. There is no reason why Diodorus' source should have gotten Tissaphemes'
excuse wrong; the reference, therefore, does not sup}X)rt the conclusions Lewis draws
from the Aramaic documents.
11
Diod. q.J8·4· Mindarus arrived early in August; Thucydides places Mindarus'
decision to leave Miletus "about the same time" (inrO 8E. "ToiJc; a:&roUc; xp6v01Jc;, 8.99. 1)
as the flight of the oligarchs from Athens and the betrayal of Oenoe (8.98), which
Andrewes (HCT V, 341) persuasively puts late in September or even early in October.
Those dates would have Mindarus waiting at Milctus between six and eight weeks.
12
8.99; Tamos: 8.p.1, 87.3; HIT V, 74·