The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

220 -THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
the Spartans to cut off the grain route. Unless the Spartan admiral
were foolish enough to come out and challenge them in more open
waters, and he was not that foolish, they must fight him within its
narrow confines. Perhaps Thrasybulus exercised his crews for as long
as five days in the hope that Mindarus would make the mistake of
seeking them out, but when it was clear he would not, there was no
point in further delay. Once they had made the decision to enter the
Hellespont, moreover, the Athenians' only reasonable plan was to
move forward in single column, so as to be able to turn most swiftly
and simply to meet any enemy attack. By staying close to the European
shore, they remained closer to the safety of their bases, should they
be needed, and they gave themselves the fullest possible time to react
to an enemy assault.
Circumstances, therefore, had given the Spartans almost every advantage
in the battle to come. With eighty-six ships they had a significant
numerical superiority. 34 They were able to fight with their
base near by at their backs, and they could choose the place and
moment of attack that suited them best. Mindarus' plan of battle made
good use of all of these advantages. He positioned his ships between
Abydos and Dardanus, a distance of some seven and one-half miles."
Placing the Syracusans on the right, the farthest up into the Hellespont,
he himself took command of the left wing, nearest its mouth.,. He
allowed the Athenian column to move forward until its left wing had
passed the promontory called "Bitch's Tomb" (Cynossema), so called
because the tomb of Hecuba, changed into a dog according to legend,
sat on its heights. The Athenian line stretched from Arrhiana on the
left to ldacus on the right." When the center was just in front of
Cynossema, where the strait was at its narrowest, he launched the first
attack, hoping to use surprise, speed, and the weight of numbers to
drive the enemy center toward the crowded waters near the shore,
where the superior fighting ability of his marines would be most effective.
38 His own assignment was likely to be the most difficult: to
outflank the enemy and cut off his escape, for Mindarus intended to
l 4 For the number, see S.IOJ.I and HCT V, 35o-351.
.l58. 104.2-
loSDiodorus (1 3-39·4) says that Hermocrates was in command, but he must be wrong,
for Thucydides has told us that the Syracusan commander had already been relieved
and had sailed off to Sparta (B.Bs).
17
8.104.2. These locations are not known.
)NFor the superiority of the Peloponnesian marines, see Diod. 1 3·40. 1.