The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

ATHENS RESPONDS 57
island. 21 Consequently, the Athenians judged them to be entirely trustworthy
and granted them autonomy. 22 That trust was vindicated, for
the Samian democracy remained loyal to the Athenians throughout
the war, even after the Athenian navy was destroyed at Aegospotami. 23
With Samos secure, the Athenians were in a position to challenge
the ambitions of the still-zealous men of Chios. Eager to expand the
number of rebels, the Chians did not wait for significant Spartan aid
to arrive before moving ahead with the program agreed upon the previous
spring at Corinth. 24 With thirteen ships under the Laconian
perioikos Deiniadas, they sailed to Lesbos and immediately brought
Methymna into rebellion, leaving four ships there to lend support.
The others then sailed on to Mytilene and caused it, too, to rebel. At
the same time, a land army of Peloponnesians, the sailors from Chalcideus'
ships who had been left at Chios,Z 5 and the allies from the
neighborhood marched northward along the mainland coast under the
command of the Spartan Eualas. 26 Starting probably from Erythrae,
they passed through Clazomenae, Phocaea, and Cyme, apparently
bringing those important cities over to their side. 27
Meanwhile, the Spartans had broken through the blockade at Spiraeum,
with the loss of four ships. The survivors refitted at Cenchreae
and sailed for Ionia under the command of Astyochus, the new navarch
sent to take command of the entire Peloponnesian fleet. 28 He arrived
''For Anaea, see HCT V, 42, 4s-46; Quinn, Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 17-
I9.
22
What precisely was implied by this grant is unclear. Perhaps they were given some
judicial privilege (G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, CQ LV = N. S. 11 [I96I], 272). Possibly,
they were given the right to strike coins, as J. P. Barron (The Silver Coins of Samos
[London, I966], 100-IOI) suggests. The gesture was probably of more psychological
than practical importance, bespeaking a special relationship of trust and confidence
between the two democracies and promising a new relationship after the war. Some
scholars connect IG 1 2 IOI (see D. M. Lewis, BSA XLIX [19S4], 29-3 I) with this grant
of autonomy, but the inscription is not dated and is too fragmentary to be useful.
"Xen. 2.2.6.
24
8.8.2.
"8.I7.I; HCT V, so.
26
8.22.
27
HCT V, so.
28 8.20. I. There has been considerable debate about whether at this time the navarchy
was a regular, annual office, undertaken and relinquished at specific times of the year.
The most influential affirmative argument was made by Beloch (GG Il 2 :2, 269-289).
The most recent negative argument is made by R. Sealey (Klio LVIII [I976], BS-
358), who believes that the navarchy was made a regular magistracy with a fixed term
only about 409. Until then, he believes, the navarch was appointed for specific tasks,
and his term ended with completion of the task. (For briefer, but useful discussions,