The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE FALL OF ATHENS 391
Athenians became contemptuous and careless. They became accustomed
to going off in search of provisions as soon as their ships returned
to Aegospotami. Their forces were in a most inconvenient base; supplies
were short and laborious to obtain. The enemy, who had time
on his side, refused to fight, and the generals had no plan that could
change the situation. Instead, they continued with their original strategy,
which now seemed to have no chance of success, and the men
must have thought they were engaged in a useless and meaningless
routine. It would have been difficult for any general to maintain morale
and discipline under the prevailing conditions, and with a divided
command and the mutual suspicion inevitable in the year after the trial
of the Arginusae generals, their problems were intensified. On the fifth
day, when the rotating command fell to Philocles, the stalemate came
to an end. He set out from shore with a squadron of thirty ships,
having given orders to the other trierarchs to man their ships and
follow him." We are not told his intentions, but there are three possibilities:
he may have been planning the usual cruise to Lampsacus,
carelessly setting out with his own squadron in advance of the rest of
the fleet in contempt of the enemy; he may have belatedly accepted
the advice of Alcibiades and begun a withdrawal to Sestos;" he may
have been trying to lure Lysander into a trap, as the Athenians had
done at the battle of Cyzicus and had tried to do at the battle of Notium.54
Although we cannot know what plan he had in mind, we
must try to understand the situation and assess the possibilities.
There was no advantage in setting out with only thirty ships without
waiting for the others if Philocles intended the usual voyage to
Lampsacus. If that was what he meant to do, he and his colleagues
were truly reckless and incompetent. The second plan also seems unlikely,
for nothing had changed to make it wise to move to Sestos.
The third scheme, if we understand it as a simple device to draw
52
Diod. IJ.I06.I. For the details of the battle I follow Diodorus, as do Ehrhart,
Strauss, and Bommelaer (see above, n. 34). Xenophon (z.1.27-29) gives an entirely
different account that has rightly gone out of favor. He says nothing of an Athenian
initiative bm tells of the usual sailing from Aegospotami and back. This time, however,
he has Lysander take advantage of the Athenians' lack of discipline to attack the scattered
and careless enemy. Lysander then captures almost the entire fleet on the beach without
a battle. For the most concise demonstration of the unlikelihood of that account, see
Ehrhart, Phoenix XXIV (1970).
nThat is the suggestion of Lotze (Lysamler, 34).
5 +-rhat is the opinion ofEhrhart (Phoenix XXIV ( 1970), 22 7) and Bommelaer (Lysandre,
I 10).