The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

200 _THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
that they were dismayed?"H But what terrified them most was the
proximity of the enemy fleet at a time when the Piraeus could not be
defended at sea. Even if all twenty surviving ships of the battle at
Euboea had made it safely home, they were no match for the victorious
fleet of Agesandridas." They were sure that the Spartans must already
be on their way to attack the harbor, and Thucydides expresses his
own opinion of what the result would have been. Had the Spartans
been bold enough they could either have blockaded the port, intensifying
the factional strife, or set up a siege, which would have led the
force on Samos to come to the rescue of their relatives and their city,
thereby losing the entire empire from the Hellespont to Euboea. The
Spartans, however, were "the most convenient of all people for the
Athenians to fight," as they proved on this occasion, among many
others. They missed their opportunity, revealing the difference between
their national character and that of the Athenians. They were
slow and timid, while the Athenians were quick and enterprising, and
the latter qualities were the ones needed for ruling the sea. The Syracusans
showed those qualities, fighting against Athens better than
other peoples because they had the same characteristics. 36
These observations by Thucydides once again endorse the judgment
of Alcibiades in restraining the troops on Samos and also the analysis
made by the Corinthians at the congress in Sparta in 432, but they
are puzzling in some respects and not entirely persuasive." The Spartans'
character had at least saved them from events such as the Sicilian
disaster: from their point of view the Athenians' characteristics might
make them seem in some ways "the most convenient of opponents,"
for it is hard to imagine how Athens could have lost the war had it
not risked so much in Sicily. Nor had the Syracusans shown much
swiftness, daring, or enterprise until the arrival of the Spartan general
Gylippus." It is interesting, too, to consider the wisdom of a Spartan
naval blockade of the Piraeus or a siege, which would have required
an associated blockade. Events suggest that the result internally would
have been not an increase in dissension but the expulsion of the extrem-
34
8.96.1-2.
HThucydides says that the Athenians had no ships to defend Piraeus (8.96.3: c:npffiv
E"'Tt T0v IlELpm&: Epf)J.Lov OV7o. nWv). He either believes the ships had not returned or
is speaking loosely.
]68.96·4-5·
17
Aicibiades, 8.86.4; Corinthians, 1.70.
19 See HCT V, J22-pJ.