The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

66 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
the Athenian camp at Miletus with some degree of probability. He
says that Phrynichus had clear information about the enemy's ships.
Probably, he argued at first that the enemy's numerical superiority
made it unwise to fight. The other generals, eager for a battle, must
have questioned the report's accuracy. Phrynichus, instead of insisting
on the reliability of his facts, shifted his ground and used uncertainty
about the enemy's numbers as a reason for not fighting. Apparently,
the other generals raised the cry of cowardice, arguing that for the
Athenians to refuse battle at sea, the element that they proudly claimed
to master, would be shameful. Once again, the artful Phrynichus
turned their argument against them, claiming that the real shame was
not in strategic withdrawal but in defeat at sea under any circumstances.
All of this was mainly sophistry, but he had still another argument.
Echoing the language of Pericles, he urged them not "to rush into
dangers of their own choosing. " 59 After the Sicilian disaster, the Athenians
were in no condition to take the offensive. This last point, we
may believe, was what won over Phrynichus' colleagues as it also has
persuaded modern scholars.
Busolt believes that an attack of uncertain result "would have been
highly excessive; a defeat would have had the loss of the land army,
too, as its result. In fact, the outcome would have been very uncertain,
for the Athenians did not have their previous tactical superiority ....
The days of Phormio were over. " 60 Meyer's view is the same: "The
absolute command of the sea, trusting in which Phormio could bravely
encounter a more numerous enemy in 429, was gone; at the moment
Athens' position in respect to the enemy was scarcely better at sea
than for decades past it had been on land. " 61 These estimates of Athenian
naval prospects in 412 do not accord well with the evidence, being
far too pessimistic. To be sure, the days of Phormio were over, but
Athens continued to maintain tactical and psychological superiority
over its enemies at sea, even after the Sicilian expedition. Earlier in
the year the Peloponnesian fleet had been intimidated in Corinthian
waters and had been driven to land at a deserted and inconvenient
base. Later, nineteen Athenian ships were enough to frighten twentyfive
of the enemy into staying in port and enduring a blockade. The
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