The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

AFTER THE SICILIAN DISASTER I 3
Spartan training and would have been elected to a common mess, their
portion contributed by a wealthier Spartan patron. 60 Among those
mothakes known to us are three men who played a significant role in
the Peloponnesian War, the military commanders Gylippus, Callicratidas,
and Lysander. That these men of inferior origins could reach
positions of such honor and eminence meant that others could hope
to do the same, if only they could acquire enough wealth to gain the
economic basis for admission to a mess and to full citizenship. The
best hope for that was through military conquest. The destruction of
the Athenian Empire in the Aegean offered the opportunity for the
acquisition of wealth for the victorious Spartans and honor for their
leaders. Men who lacked the means for citizenship could hope to gain
it through warfare. Men like Gylippus and Lysander, who already
held citizenship but whose position of honor and respect was clouded
by inferior origins, could hope to improve their status by victory in
war. All of these men would provide powerful pressure for a more
forward and aggressive policy than was normal for Sparta.
Nor did the drive for "the hegemony of all Greece" lack support in
higher Spartan circles. The faction that had been eager to break the
Peace of Nicias since 42 1, that had favored sending help to the Syracusans
and fortifying Decelea, must have been riding high after the
defeat of the Athenians in Sicily. Agis, still bearing the glory and
influence given him by his victory at Mantinea, was at Decelea, enjoying
powers unusual even for a Spartan king and eager to increase
his reputation and power by pursuing the expected collapse of the
Athenian Empire under his leadership. 61
Those Spartans who traditionally had opposed adventures outside
the Peloponnesus, had favored the Peace of Nicias, and had resisted
sending help to Sicily and setting up a fort in Attica were certainly
less prominent in 4 r 3. The pacific King Pleistoanax found his already
weak position further undermined by the condemnation and exile of
his brother for cowardice at the battle of Man tinea. 62 So he was in no
position to provide effective leadership with the cautious policy he
favored, especially after Mantinea and Sicily. Yet he and those who
agreed with him, normally the dominant element in Sparta, had even
60
The most important contribution to the above account is the article of D. Lotze,
(Historia XI [1962], 427-435). Other useful discussions are Oliva, Sparta, 174-177; and
Toynbee, Problems, 345, n. 3·
61
For the powers and influence of Agis at this time, see 8.5.1-4 and HCT V, 12.
62
5.72.1; Kagan, Peace oJNicias, 126-128.