The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIVE THOUSAND 189
Alcibiades and his army on Samos but also "those who had been
sending embassies to Spana, lest they do some harm to the city without
consulting the majority."' They did not urge the discontented to take
up arms and launch a counterrevolution. Given the uncertainty and
suspicion of the times and the capacity for murder and terror still
controlled by the extremists, that would be too dangerous. If such an
action failed, moreover, it would increase the danger of the betrayal
of the city at which their words hinted. They did not even use the
perilous language of opposing the movement toward extreme oligarchy.
Instead, they spoke of constitutional reform by which the Four
Hundred would be asked merely to carry out promises they had already
made: "to appoint the Five Thousand in fact and not in name and
[thereby] to establish a more equal polity."' Privately, no doubt, they
feared a betrayal of the city far more than an attack from Samos. In
fact, they were stirred to action by the news that Alcibiades had
acquired a position of leadership on Samos, which persuaded them
that the days of the oligarchy were numbered.
Thucydides goes out of his way to assert that the call for the Five
Thousand was only a political slogan behind which the dissident leaders
concealed their envy of the other members of the Four Hundred,
who had gained dominant positions at their expense, and their personal
ambitions. Although we have suggested that other forces were at work,
we need not doubt that such thoughts and feelings played some pan.
These men were Athenian politicians and, therefore, had been raised
in a highly competitive culture in which ambition to achieve a position
of leadership and respect in the state was natural and nothing of which
to be ashamed; still, we should not overestimate such motives. More
pressing than jealousy and ambition were two other motives: fear and
patriotism. If the oppressively narrow oligarchy was left to its own
devices, it might turn under pressure against suspected dissidents of
whom Aristocrates and Theramenes would be obvious examples. If
the Samian democrats took control of Athens from a still united and
narrow oligarchy, none of its founders could expect much mercy from
the victors. On the other hand, as the danger to the government grew,
so did the incentive for the extremists to seek shelter in a Spanan
occupation. Everything we know about the moderate leaders tells us
that they opposed yielding Athenian independence. The honors they