The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

378 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
other hand, Athens had been forced to desperate measures to win at
Arginusae and was still badly short of money. A renewal of Persian
support for Sparta and the extension of the fighting it would entail
would exhaust the Athenian treasury and perhaps eventually even
Athenian manpower. In these circumstances, the Spartans' offer ought
to have been most appealing; yet the Athenians rejected it. To be sure,
the Spartans still held Abydos in the Hellespont, the important island
of Chios, and significant cities such as Ephesus, Phocaea, and Cyme.
The loss of these places would not be pleasant, but none was vital to
the economic, financial, or military security of Athens. The loss of all
would have been well worth a true and lasting peace and even a cessation
of hostilities that lasted long enough to give Athens a chance to
put her empire back in order, fill her treasury, and restore her agricultural
activity.
In the face of such tempting advantages, how can the Athenian
rejection be explained? It is both easy and traditional to blame the
foolish Athenian masses and the reckless demagogues who misled
them. That is the line Aristotle takes, saying: "Some were eager to
make peace, but the mob did not listen to them, for they were deceived
by Cleophon. He prevented the peace from coming into being; entering
the assembly drunk and dressed in his military breastplate, he said
that he would not permit a peace agreement unless the Spartans surrendered
all the cities."' Even if we accept what seems very much like
a hostile version of the facts, the question remains as to why the
majority of the assembly voted with the allegedly drunken and bellicose
demagogue. They were fully aware of the state of their treasury and
the drain on their manpower. They, most of all, must have been
tempted by an end to the fighting, the withdrawal of the Spartans,
and a return to their farms; yet they voted against peace. However
foolish they may have been, they must have had some reasons. Once
again, we may find a clue in their suspicion of the good faith of the
enemy. We would be mistaken to neglect the great impact made on
the Athenians by the failure of the Peace of Nicias. No sooner had
the peace been sworn than the Spartans failed to carry out its main
provision, the return of Amphipolis. The Athenians had extended
themselves and made a treaty of alliance with the erstwhile enemy
only to find that Amphipolis was still unredeemed and that the Spartans
allowed the Boeotians to demolish the Athenian fort of Panactum
'Arist. Ath. Pol. 34· 1.