The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

166 TliE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
of taming popular power, for with the fleet at home and its crews
disbanded, the oligarchs might hope to rule by terror and ultimately
by the acquiescence of the hoplites. The extremists, therefore, must
have planned to seek peace from the beginning but concealed their
intentions until the right time. Once the city was cowed by terror,
the Four Hundred were in power, and the extremists held the upper
hand within it, they could pursue negotiations.
Even then, however, they could not ignore the moderates, who
might be intimidated or persuaded into joining in peace negotiations
but would insist on honorable terms that would allow Athens to retain
its power and empire. The extremists, on the other hand, although
they preferred to keep the empire, were prepared, in the last resort,
to make peace "on any terms tolerable," even those requiring them to
bring in the enemy and to give up Athens' walls and fleet and, with
them, its autonomy. 11 Theramenes and his moderate supporters, on
the contrary, always found such terms intolerable. Ir was precisely to
prevent such a betrayal that Theramenes led the effort that overthrew
the Four Hundred." He had joined the movement against the democracy
in order to wage the war more effectively; he worked for the
overthrow of the oligarchy when he suspected it of preparing to sell
out to the Spartans; under the restored democracy, he played a leading
part in the fighting until, in 405, the battle at Aegospotami put an end
to all hope. In 41 1 he and his moderate associates were unwilling to
make major concessions to the Spartans.
That is not to say that Theramenes and his associates were unwilling
to discuss terms of peace with Sparta. They may have hoped that the
Spartans' failure to win the expected easy victories in the Aegean and
Ionia, combined with the inadequate and unreliable support provided
by Tissaphernes, might have made them ready to agree to a reasonable
peace, especially with an Athenian regime that was no longer a radical
democracy. If the enemy was prepared to make peace on the basis of
the status quo, well and good. If not, the war would continue. The
extremists, although they were ultimately ready to make far greater
concessions, preferred the status quo. On these terms, both factions
within the Four Hundred could agree, so the Athenian ambassadors
offered the terms to King Agis at Decelea." He rejected their proposal
n8.9o.2; 91.3. See also HCT V, JO]-J08.
n8.9D--91.
33 8.]0.2. Thucydides does not mention the terms. Aristotle (Ath. Pol. p.J) cites
them as €K6:repm. T\J"Yx&vmxJw E.xovrE"i. Busolt (GG III:z, 141)0, n. 1) suggests that the