The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

346 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
The double lines on the wings were meant to achieve the same effect
there, where there were no islands to provide protection. 70 But it is
worth considering how they were arranged to achieve the best results.
The most obvious alignment would place the rear line of ships behind
the gaps separating the ships in the front line, serving as a clear deterrent
to the diekplous. Closer study of the evidence, however, suggests
that the Athenians employed a refinement that had extraordinary advantages.
They appear to have separated their ships on the wings by
about twice the usual distance, with the ships in the rear line filling
the gaps behind the front. 71 The greater gap might lure the Spartans
into attempting the diekplous; the Athenian ships behind the gap could
come forward to stop an intruding ship's progress, leaving it vulnerable
to a ram from either side. The element of surprise so achieved could
have devastating results. The double gap between Athenian ships on
the wings, however, had another crucial result: it lengthened the Athenian
line and enabled it to outflank the enemy rather than being
outflanked. Keeping the usual separations, the Athenians would have
presented a front of about 95 ships, 30 on each wing and about 35 in
the center, against a Spartan front of 120; the Spartans would have
extended beyond each end of the Athenian by I 2 or I 3 ships. In that
purpose. Herbst fell into this error because he failed to consider the spacing between
ships or the length of the main island, although he took the trouble of discovering the
depth of the sea around it (Bo, n. 29). He also believed that the three ships of the
navarchs stood behind the others in the center. Although the dative in E'JT£ BE 'Tairrm~
may mean "after" or "behind" these ships, and is often so translated, it need not be
and in this context cannot be, because the passage goes on to place the twelve or so
allied ships next to these three, which would make for a double line in the center,
flatly contradicting Xenophon's assertion at the beginning that the Samians and the
taxiarchs were in a single line. I prefer to render the dative "in addition to" these ships,
and thus to see them next in line after the taxiarchs and before the allies.
70
The west coast of the island from its southern tip to the little islet near the northern
end, which would protect the center's right flank and beyond which it need not extend,
is about 900 yards long (see Map 12). If the center of the Athenian fleet placed its right
wing next to the islet, there would have been some 240 yards of coast beyond its left
wing. The right wing probably took up a position entirely north of the island; the left
wing might have taken a position immediately next to the center, in which case some
forty-eight of their ships would have extended beyond the island's southern tip. In
fact, there was no need to line up close to the center, for it was rendered safe against
encirclement by the proximity of the island. It seems likely that the wings allowed the
center to stand alone, placed their double lines in the open water at either end of the
island, and thereby lengthened their line well beyond that of the enemy.
71
Busolt alone (GG lll:2, 1594-1595) has seen that the second line of ships must have
stood behind the gaps and that the separation between ships must have been greater
than usual.