The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

350 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
reduced from 3 5 to 2 5, not an overwhelmingly significant change. The
Athenians would have given up the advantage afforded them by the
islands, but they would present him with a threat from the front and
rear. Conon's force, to be sure, was shut up in the harbor, but the
Spartan situation would still be unusual and uncomfortable. In any
case, the prospect was not remarkably attractive. On balance, it might
still have been better to fight at Mytilene than at Arginusae, but the
difference was not so great as to be obvious and decisive. But we do
not know whether any of these thoughts went through Callicratidas'
mind when he saw the Athenian array and heard the warning of
Hermon. It is enough to say that his words need not have been merely
the thoughtless response of a rash young man.
Having decided to fight, Callicratidas chose the best tactics he could.
The threat on the flanks was primary, and he had no choice but to
meet it. Diodorus tells us that since he could not make his line equal
to the length of the enemy's, "he divided his force, forming it into two
fleets, fighting a double battle, one on each wing. For this reason he
aroused great astonishment in the spectators, who were looking on
from many sides, since there were four fleets fighting the naval battie.
" 80 The fighting, then, took place on the two wings, with half of
the Spartan fleet against four Athenian detachments on each wing.
Callicratidas' maneuver left the Spartan fleet without a center with
which to face the Athenian single line in front of the island. This
movement.created a risk of attack by the Athenian center against the
inner flanks of the two Spartan fleets, but there was no way to meet
the unorthodox Athenian strategy without running some risk, and the
danger on the outer flanks from the massed Athenian wings was both
more imminent and more dangerous. Perhaps Callicratidas made his
decision after seeing that the Athenian center was a single line and
would probably stand on the defensive; perhaps he ignored the threat
from the center only because of the need to respond to the danger on
the wings. In either case, he was forced to gamble, and his choice
seems to have been the best he could make in the circumstances.
Since the Athenians had the advantage of numbers and position and
had seized the initiative as well, we might expect them to have achieved
a quick and easy victory, but they did not. The battle was long and
hard. "First the fighting was in close order, and later it was scattered.""
80
13·98·4-5·
81
Xen. 1.6.33.